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ABSTRACT
Just as Newtonian mechanics breaks down when we look at the 
constituent pieces of our universe—subatomic particles—
neoclassical economics breaks down when we look at the constituent 
pieces of our society—individual people. At the scale of subatomic 
particles, quantum mechanics provides new foundations for 
understanding the physical world; at the scale of individual decision-
making, behavioral economics promises new foundations for 
understanding the social, economic, and legal worlds. As this Article 
explains, this analogy between Newtonian and quantum physics, on 
the one hand, and neoclassical and behavioral economics, on the 
other hand, has much to reveal about law and economics. 
With the help of numerous examples of key findings in 
behavioral law and economics, I take three principles from quantum 
mechanics (the uncertainty principle, the correspondence principle, 
and the quantum principle) and show how analogous principles in 
economics help illuminate the future trajectory of law and 
economics. I then seek to accelerate this trajectory by proposing an 
agenda for strengthening behavioral law and economics through a 
stronger grounding in theory and specifically a “quantum” theory of 
decision-making.
Along the way, the analysis leads me to challenge some 
common misconceptions about law and economics: Behavioral and 
neoclassical approaches to law and economics are not rivals, but 
partners; simplistic and artificial assumptions about human behavior 
remain a problem in law and economics, but perhaps most acutely in 
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behavioral law and economics; and the notion that neoclassical 
economics promotes a deregulatory agenda and behavioral 
economics promotes a pro-regulatory agenda is, as often as not, 
exactly backwards. 
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INTRODUCTION
The traditional, neoclassical approach to law and economics is 
under attack. The challenger is behavioral law and economics. A 
tsunami of empirical findings documenting how individuals behave 
in puzzling and sometimes paradoxical ways has washed away the 
foundations of the neoclassical approach, which was built upon 
simplistic assumptions about human rationality.  
A century ago, Newtonian mechanics was under attack. The 
challenger was quantum mechanics. Astounding empirical findings 
that documented how matter behaved in puzzling and sometimes 
paradoxical ways undermined the Newtonian framework, which had 
described the physical world in simplistically deterministic terms. 
This analogy between quantum physics and Newtonian 
physics, on the one hand, and behavioral economics and neoclassical 
economics, on the other hand, reflects the similarity of the 
underlying paradigm shifts in physics and economics. Just as 
Newtonian mechanics breaks down when we look at the constituent 
pieces of our universe (subatomic particles), neoclassical economics 
breaks down when we look at the constituent pieces of our society: 
individual people. In this way, just as quantum mechanics challenged 
the nano-foundations for Newtonian mechanics, behavioral 
economics challenges the nano-foundations for neoclassical 
economics. And just as quantum mechanics superseded Newtonian 
mechanics, we might expect that neoclassical economics is headed 
for the same fate as Newtonian physics.  
But which fate is that? If an engineer or a scientist wants to 
build a state-of-the-art bridge, design a supersonic jet engine, or 
extract a core sample from under two miles of Antarctic ice, she 
doesn’t use quantum physics. She uses Newtonian physics. She 
might not even know quantum physics, although she probably knows 
enough quantum physics to know that Newtonian mechanics is 
more-or-less wrong. How can this be? 
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The reason is the “Correspondence Principle,” which describes 
the relationship between quantum mechanics and Newtonian 
mechanics. The concept is twofold. On the one hand, quantum 
mechanics has shown us that many of the premises and predictions 
of classical mechanics are wrong. But on the other hand, while 
individual particles may behave in ways that defy classical theory, it 
is also the case that when we aggregate those individual particles up 
to the scale of human society, classical physics still gets the job done 
most of the time. Newtonian physics builds bridges, but we need 
quantum physics to have iPhones.1 The Correspondence Principle 
reminds us that as a practical matter quantum mechanics and 
Newtonian mechanics are not competing visions of the universe, but 
complementary methods of understanding the physical world.  
The central claim of this Article is that the analogy between 
physics and economics can be extended to this concept of 
correspondence: I argue that an equivalent Correspondence Principle 
describes the relationship between behavioral (“quantum”) 
economics and neoclassical (“Newtonian”) economics. The future of 
law and economics will not be a process of the behavioral replacing 
the neoclassical. The shift will be more subtle. The question law and 
economics faces today is about the proper division of labor between 
neoclassical and behavioral approaches. When is law trying to build 
a bridge? When is law trying to build an iPhone? 
Now, the behavioral approach to law and economics is under 
attack too. The challenge here comes from within the behavioral 
sciences. In recent years, the social sciences have been rocked by a 
litany of revelations that prominent, sometimes landmark, empirical 
findings could not be replicated in later studies. The seminal results 
appear to have been the product of poor experimental design or 
random chance. This crisis of credibility has nowhere been more 
acute than in behavioral psychology, a field that has supplied many 
of the insights upon which behavioral law and economics has relied.2
In his best-selling book on behavioral psychology and economics, 
Thinking Fast and Slow, Daniel Kahneman devoted an entire chapter 
to “priming effects,”3 citing twelve articles finding that subtle, 
unconscious primes have dramatic effects on behavior—for example, 
 1. See infra Section I.B. 
 2. See, e.g., Open Science Collaboration, Estimating the Reproducibility of 
Psychological Science, 349 SCI. MAG. 943, 944 (2015) (attempting to replicate the 
results of 100 studies published in three top psychology journals and observing 
successful replication of only 36.1% to 47.4% of results, depending on criteria). 
 3. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST AND SLOW 1, 50-58 (2011). 
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exposure to words associated with old age (e.g., Florida, bald, gray, 
wrinkle) leads people to walk more slowly, and smiling while 
reading leads people to find cartoons funnier.4 These results, striking 
and numerous, led Kahneman to conclude, “The results are not made 
up, nor are they statistical flukes. You have no choice but to accept 
that the major conclusions of these studies are true.”5
Yet over the past few years, a series of careful studies have 
failed to replicate these key findings.6 For example, seventeen
independent labs attempted to replicate the finding that smiling 
would lead individuals to find comics funnier, and not one found 
evidence of an effect.7 A meta-analysis of all twelve of the priming 
studies cited in Thinking Fast and Slow reached the opposite 
conclusion from the book: “You should not accept any of the 
conclusions of these studies as true.”8 Prominent behavioral 
researchers, including Kahneman himself, have described this 
replicability crisis as a “train wreck” and called for reforms to 
empirical methods in experimental research.9
With confidence in decades’ worth of empirical findings in 
behavioral science shaken, one might ask whether the ascendancy of 
behavioral economics in law should be reconsidered. No: There are 
simply too many compelling—and well replicated—findings from 
behavioral economics for law and economics not to embrace those 
insights. Instead, we should ask: What is the path forward for 
behavioral law and economics, a field which established itself by 
casting doubt on the assumptions of neoclassical economics, but 
which now faces a healthy dose of skepticism about its own 
premises? 
 4. Id.
 5. Id. at 57. 
 6. See Stéphane Doyen et al., Behavioral Priming: It’s All in the Mind, but 
Whose Mind?, 7 PLOS ONE 1 (2012) (finding no evidence to support the result that 
exposure to words associated with old age leads people to walk slower). 
 7. Ulrich Shimmack, Moritz Heene & Kamini Kesavan, Reconstruction of 
a Train Wreck: How Priming Research Went off the Rails, REPLICABILITY-INDEX 
BLOG (Feb. 2, 2017), https://replicationindex.wordpress.com/2017/02/02/ 
reconstruction-of-a-train-wreck-how-priming-research-went-of-the-rails/ 
[https://perma.cc/8TZR-VARJ]. 
 8. Id.
 9. Open E-mail from Daniel Kahneman, A Proposal to Deal with 
Questions About Priming Effects (Sept. 26, 2012 9:32 AM), cited in Ed Yong, Nobel 
Laureate Challenges Psychologists to Clean Up Their Act, NATURE (Oct. 3, 2012), 
http://www.nature.com/news/nobel-laureate-challenges-psychologists-to-clean-up-
their-act-1.11535 [https://perma.cc/8ML9-YWAE]; Shimmack, Heene & Kesavan, 
supra note 7 (“I placed too much faith in underpowered studies.”). 
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Here, again, the analogy to quantum mechanics becomes 
useful. To the Correspondence Principle I add two more concepts 
from quantum physics that suggest useful analogies in economics. I 
label these concepts the Uncertainty Principle and the Quantum 
Conjecture.10
The Uncertainty Principle is the most familiar concept from 
quantum physics. It reflects the idea that it is impossible to observe a 
particle without affecting the particle. The analogous concept in 
social sciences is often called the “observer effect,” and I explore 
how it plays out in experimental work on the endowment effect and 
social (other-regarding) preferences—cognitive phenomena of 
central importance in behavioral law and economics. The 
Uncertainty Principle for law and economics unpacks the 
methodological limitations inherent in much existing work upon 
which behavioral law and economics relies. By doing so, it helps 
clarify the way to more robust and policy-relevant experimental 
work. Much of this work is already underway, and I identify 
examples of key innovations scholars in behavioral law and 
economics have made. 
One of the key moves for behavioral law and economics that I 
advocate is to connect empirical findings to theories of human 
decision-making. A set of theories that incorporate and make 
coherent the many results from the laboratory lays the groundwork 
for predicting how behavioral effects will manifest outside the lab—
i.e., in the real-world settings relevant to legal policy.  
The Quantum Conjecture is my tentative step toward one such 
theory. In physics, the Quantum Principle says that matter and 
energy cannot always be subdivided; they exist in discrete, 
indivisible chunks called quanta. This provides a rough but powerful 
analogy: My Quantum Conjecture for behavioral law and economics 
is that human attention cannot be perfectly and infinitely divided (as 
traditional models of economic decision-making assume), but can 
only be parceled out in discrete chunks. As I will explain, a model of 
decision-making as rationing a limited number of packets of mental 
effort out among a multitude of important choices may help unify 
 10. See infra note 15 and accompanying text. As I will note at greater 
length below as well, analogies between law and physics are not new, although the 
specific applications I identify and lessons I draw from them are. The one exception 
is that Tom Ulen alluded to the Correspondence Principle (although not in so many 
words) some years ago. See Thomas S. Ulen, Firmly Grounded: Economics in the 
Future of Law, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 433, 461-62 (1997). I discuss his brief but incisive 
take on this idea below. See infra note 84 and accompanying text. 
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various behavioral phenomena that we currently treat as distinct 
(e.g., the “certainty effect” and “choice overload”) and legal 
phenomena from diverse areas (e.g., “unfair prejudice” in evidence 
and the “precautionary principle” in regulation). 
The analogy to physics offers one more contribution. By 
casting law and economics in a different light, the analogy to physics 
overturns some prevalent misconceptions about law and economics. I 
have already challenged the notion that behavioral and neoclassical 
approaches are rivals rather than two faces of the same coin. To this I 
add that behavioral law and economics, not just neoclassical 
economics, must face up to the critique that it relies on simplistic and 
artificial assumptions about human behavior. Finally, I reject the 
stereotype that neoclassical economics is ideologically right-wing or 
anti-regulatory and that behavioral economics is ideologically left-
wing or pro-regulatory. (Indeed, I will argue that there is a sense in 
which the reverse is true.) 
In short, the contributions of this Article are threefold. First, the 
analogy to quantum and Newtonian physics, and specifically the 
Uncertainty and Correspondence Principles, helps to organize and 
reframe the relationship between behavioral and neoclassical law and 
economics. Second, the Quantum Conjecture suggests a direction 
toward more broadly applicable theories in behavioral law and 
economics. This is a necessary next step for the field to overcome 
concerns that its mish-mash of empirical findings yields 
indeterminate behavioral predictions and is therefore not policy-
relevant. Third, delving deeper into the analogy reveals further 
lessons for law and economics—lessons that I hope will disrupt 
some of the generalizations about the field that we’ve become too 
comfortable with. 
The remainder of the Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, I 
introduce the three principles from quantum physics that will frame 
this Article: the Uncertainty Principle, the Correspondence Principle, 
and the Quantum Principle. In Part II, I sketch central features of 
neoclassical economics and behavioral economics, focusing on what 
will be salient in what follows. In each of the next three Parts, I 
discuss how each of the three principles from quantum physics has 
an analogue in behavioral economics. Each time, I provide a set of 
three examples of the principle applied to concrete questions. Each 
time, I draw two lessons from each principle.  
Before I proceed, I must sound a note of caution. I am not a 
physicist, and I make no claim that I will characterize quantum 
physics with great accuracy. My goal is not to expound upon 
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physics, but upon law and economics. For this purpose, only the 
rudiments of the principles I borrow from quantum mechanics are 
sufficient.
I. THREE PRINCIPLES FROM QUANTUM MECHANICS
We are familiar from grade school with some of the basic 
concepts of physics. We learned about force, mass, and acceleration, 
the distinction between energy and matter, how certain types of 
energy such as light and sound travel in waves, and how matter is 
made up of discrete particles known as atoms. These are among the 
fundamental principles of what might be called classical, or 
Newtonian, mechanics.  
Although Newtonian mechanics has been very successful at 
describing the interactions of most of the physical systems that we 
can see in the world, it breaks down when we look at the tiniest 
constituent pieces of our universe: subatomic particles.  
Once we no longer look at matter in the aggregate, but focus on 
its smallest individual components, the world starts to look quite a 
bit different from what the classical model would predict. Matter 
behaves like energy, and energy behaves like matter. Particles 
behave like waves, and waves behave like particles. (Or perhaps 
more accurately, particles are waves.11) Two things can be in the 
same place at the same time, and the same thing can be in two 
different places at the same time. (Or perhaps more accurately, 
nothing is anywhere until you look at it, and then it’s somewhere.12)
One of the great triumphs of modern science has been the 
development of a theory of quantum physics, a model of the physical 
world capable of explaining and predicting the behavior of energy 
and matter at the subatomic scale.13 The term “quantum” refers to a 
 11. See Wave–Particle Duality, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
Wave–particle_duality [https://perma.cc/H45L-4CDB] (last visited Oct. 1, 2017). 
 12. See Wave Function Collapse, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
Wave_function_collapse [https://perma.cc/USN2-FBMS] (last visited Oct. 1, 2017). 
 13. To quote Wikipedia (no source more esoteric need be consulted for this 
discussion):
Quantum mechanics (QM; also known as quantum physics or quantum 
theory), including quantum field theory, is a branch of physics which is 
the fundamental theory of nature at the small scales and energy levels of 
atoms and subatomic particles. Classical physics (the physics existing 
before quantum mechanics) derives from quantum mechanics as an 
approximation valid only at large (macroscopic) scales. Quantum 
mechanics differs from classical physics in that: energy, momentum and 
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very small but discrete quantity of something.14 As I will explain, this 
concept is central to the underlying theory in quantum physics and 
offers insights into behavioral law and economics as well. 
Quantum physics is a well-developed and immensely complex 
set of theories grounded in decades of experimental observations. I 
have no hope of summarizing, let alone expounding upon, the field. 
Rather, my object in this Part is simply to identify three basic 
concepts that have been crucial to the development of quantum 
physics. I will refer to them as the Uncertainty Principle, the 
Correspondence Principle, and the Quantum Principle. Each of these 
three concepts distinguishes quantum mechanics from Newtonian 
mechanics in a different way. The concepts are non-technical, and I 
will argue that the intuitions for these concepts translate neatly to the 
context of law and economics. 
A. Uncertainty 
Perhaps the best-known term in quantum mechanics is the 
Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle. So well-known is this principle, in 
fact, that a number of law review articles have already noted 
analogies to it in the field of legal studies!15 But its relevance extends 
other quantities are often restricted to discrete values (quantization), 
objects have characteristics of both particles and waves (i.e. wave-
particle duality), and there are limits to the precision with which 
quantities can be known (uncertainty principle) . . . . Important 
applications of quantum theory include quantum chemistry, 
superconducting magnets, light-emitting diodes, and the laser, the 
transistor and semiconductors such as the microprocessor, medical and 
research imaging such as magnetic resonance imaging and electron 
microscopy. Explanations for many biological and physical phenomena 
are rooted in the nature of the chemical bond, most notably the macro-
molecule DNA. 
Quantum Mechanics, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_mechanics 
[https://perma.cc/X2PF-B2TL] (last visited Oct. 1, 2017). 
 14. See id.
 15. This has mainly been in the context of constitutional theory, although 
scholars have drawn very different lessons from the same analogy. See Elise Carter, 
Comment, The Particulate Constitution: Uncertainty and New Originalism, 2015 
BYU L. REV. 1051, 1070 (analogizing the Constitution to a particle for which the 
current position and trajectory cannot be perfectly fixed); Roberto L. Corrada, 
Justifying a Search for a Unifying Theory of Unconstitutional Conditions, 72 DENV.
U. L. REV. 1011, 1030 (1995) (arguing that constitutional theories must allow for 
and account for fundamental uncertainty about observed outcomes); Laurence H. 
Tribe, The Curvature of Constitutional Space: What Lawyers Can Learn from 
Modern Physics, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1, 20-23 (1989) (arguing that just as observing 
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beyond analogies with “uncertainty” in the law. It also draws a 
parallel to the limits of what observation through experimentation (in 
economics) can reveal.  
What I focus on here is not, technically, the Heisenberg 
Uncertainty Principle (although the two are often conflated).16 The 
uncertainty principle relevant here is the “observer effect.” The 
observer effect describes the fact that the mere act of observing the 
particle affects the particle’s behavior. To identify a particle’s 
location, you must observe it. But to observe it, you must observe it 
with something. (Visual observation, for example, requires photons.) 
Thus, the process of observing requires the observer to interact with 
the observed particle. But by interacting with the particle, we have 
changed the behavior of the very thing we have attempted to 
observe. (For example, the interaction between the photons used by 
the observer and the observed particle will change the momentum of 
the particle.) 
The basic idea here, then, is that the very act of observing a 
system changes the behavior of the system.  
B. Correspondence  
Less well known, but perhaps more important for our purposes, 
is the Correspondence Principle. This principle, simply put, states 
that quantum theory should generate identical predictions to classical 
theory when the system being studied is large (relative to the 
quantum scale).17
a particle changes its momentum, rendering a legal judgment on the social structure 
changes the social structure). The indeterminacy implied by uncertainty principles 
also draws analogies to the jurisprudential indeterminacies identified by legal 
realists and scholars in the Critical Legal Studies movement. See Elise Porter, Note, 
The Player and the Dice: Physics and Critical Legal Theory, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1571, 
1571-72 (1991); R. George Wright, Should the Law Reflect the World?: Lessons for 
Legal Theory from Quantum Mechanics, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 855, 856 (1991). 
 16. Consistent with (but not because of) the observer effect, the Heisenberg 
Uncertainty Principle is often described in terms of the impossibility of knowing 
both the location and momentum of a particle at any given time. See
Correspondence Principle, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
Correspondence_principle [https://perma.cc/4SAE-XKG3] (last visited Oct. 1, 
2017).
 17. See, e.g., id. (“In physics, the correspondence principle states that the 
behavior of systems described by the theory of quantum mechanics (or by the old 
quantum theory) reproduces classical physics in the limit of large quantum 
numbers.”).
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Consider the phenomenon of “quantum tunneling.”18 Quantum 
physics explicitly rejects the prediction of Newtonian physics that a 
particle cannot penetrate a barrier that requires more energy to 
surmount than the particle possesses. Imagine I bounce a basketball 
against a brick wall. In Newtonian mechanics, the basketball bounces 
back to me; there is no way that I can impart enough energy to the 
basketball that the basketball, or even a tiny part of it, could pass 
through the wall. Yet at the quantum scale, particles always have a 
probability of passing through such a barrier. In any cluster of 
particles, some fraction of them will pass through a barrier that 
Newtonian physics would deem impenetrable. It is as if, when I 
throw a basketball against a brick wall, a slightly smaller basketball 
bounces back to me, and a very tiny basketball appears on the far 
side of the wall and keeps on bouncing away from me.19
But of course this is not what happens when we throw actual 
basketballs against actual walls. This is not a refutation of quantum 
physics. It is merely an affirmation of the fact that the aggregation of 
countless quantum interactions in the physical world we observe at 
the human scale results in phenomena that are almost perfectly 
described by Newtonian physics. 
To put it more starkly, the Correspondence Principle means 
that Newtonian mechanics is fundamentally wrong—its assumptions 
about the nature of matter and energy simply do not describe the 
actual makeup of matter and energy—but Newtonian mechanics 
nonetheless is a remarkably useful approximation of the quantum 
mechanical reality when we are talking about the everyday world. 
Now, this is not to say that quantum mechanics is irrelevant to 
everyday life—quite the contrary. Virtually every reader of this 
Article relies on quantum physics throughout the day. The solid-state 
 18. For excellent illustrations of quantum tunneling and real-world 
applications of the phenomenon, see Quantum Tunneling, WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_tunneling [https://perma.cc/5UUR-6HV2] 
(last visited Oct. 1, 2017). 
 19. See Quantum Tunnelling and the Uncertainty Principle, PHYSICS OF THE 
UNIVERSE, http://www.physicsoftheuniverse.com/topics_quantum_uncertainty.html 
[https://perma.cc/5RLY-HDXE] (last visited Oct. 1, 2017) (discussing connections 
between tunnelling and uncertainty in quantum physics). This phenomenon can be 
understood as an application of the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle. Since one can 
never know with certainty both the location and the momentum of a particle, then if 
we are sure that the particle does not have enough momentum to penetrate the 
barrier, then we cannot be sure that the particle is not already on the other side of the 
barrier. And if we are sure that the particle is not already through the barrier, then 
we cannot be sure that it lacks sufficient energy to penetrate it. Wild, huh? 
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memory on which our mobile devices depend—so-called “flash” 
memory—relies on quantum tunneling to work.20
The point here is twofold: On the one hand, quantum 
mechanics has shown us that many of the premises and predictions 
of classical mechanics are wrong. But on the other hand, while 
individual particles may engage in behaviors that defy classical 
theory, it is also the case that when we aggregate those individual 
particles up to the scale of human society, classical physics still gets 
the job done most of the time—just not all of the time. I do not need 
to know quantum theory to build a bridge or sharpen a pencil. On the 
other hand, I do need quantum theory to build a smart phone.  
C. Quanta 
Third and finally, we have the Quantum Principle. In our 
ordinary experience, we perceive things like time, space, and energy 
as flowing smoothly and continuously. Actions and effort, we might 
also think, can be calibrated smoothly and continuously, like moving 
a slider or turning a dial, rather than only discretely and 
discontinuously, like toggling an on/off switch. I can move a little bit 
faster; I can walk a little bit slower. 
But at the subatomic scale, there is a sense in which objects and 
actions are discrete, not continuous. Mass and energy exist in 
discrete packets, and in some conditions, a particle’s energy can only 
increase in certain intervals. An atom can have one electron or two 
electrons, but it is impossible to have one-and-a-half electrons. 
Further, an electron in an atom can only have certain amounts of 
energy. Intermediate energy levels are simply not possible. (Hence, 
an electron that changes energy levels makes a “quantum leap”—the 
smallest possible change in energy states.)  
It is as if on some surfaces you can walk or run, but it is 
impossible to jog. This is a Quantum Principle: the principle that 
certain physical phenomena occur only in discrete quantities or 
packets, called quanta.  
 20. See Flash Memory, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
Flash_memory [https://perma.cc/XFA9-SFYX] (last visited Oct. 1, 2017). 
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II. NEOCLASSICAL AND BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS
In this Part, I briefly introduce neoclassical and behavioral 
economics before tying them in with the uncertainty, 
correspondence, and quantum principles. 
A. Neoclassical Economics 
The methodology of most of the work that has been done in 
law and economics over the last half-century is neoclassical 
economics. There is a vast amount that could be said about this field, 
but I will briefly highlight only two of its most salient concepts, both 
of which are central to understanding the critique of neoclassical 
economics by behavioral economists. I will then note a third concept 
that is more characteristic of neoclassical law and economics, not 
neoclassical economics, and which is perhaps the crux of the assault 
of behavioral law and economics on neoclassical law and economics. 
1. The Law of Demand 
The single most powerful tool in the economist’s toolkit, and 
the most general and robust of all theoretical predictions in 
economics, is the Law of Demand. The Law of Demand states that 
people will consume more of something when its price is lower and 
less of something when its price is higher. Importantly, “price” is not 
limited solely to the amount of money something costs, but also the 
amount of time or energy it takes to realize a goal, or the lost 
opportunity that one forgoes when choosing to do one thing rather 
than another.21 This notion that human behavior responds to prices in 
this way allows economists both to understand behavior and to 
generate useful and consistent predictions about behavior in 
countless fields of human activity. Application of the Law of 
Demand to generate models of human behavior is often called “price 
theory.”22 Perhaps the most famous price theorist was Gary Becker, 
 21. See Opportunity Cost, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
Opportunity_cost [https://perma.cc/7YPQ-QUET] (last visited Oct. 1, 2017). In 
other words, “price” is equivalent to “opportunity cost” in this context. 
 22. See Price, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Price 
[https://perma.cc/4SHX-LN7Z] (last visited Oct. 1, 2017). The other main category 
of neoclassical microeconomic theory is “game theory,” which relies on similar 
assumptions about human decision-making but explores rational, optimizing 
behavior in strategic settings rather than in contexts of supply and demand. See 
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for whom the Law of Demand was a unifying principle permitting 
insight into not just markets, but a wide range of social, legal, and 
political institutions, including crime, discrimination, fertility, 
marriage, education, and addiction.23
Importantly, the Law of Demand is a unifying principle that 
relates much of the theoretical and empirical work in neoclassical 
economics. Theoretical work uses the principles of the Law of 
Demand to develop formal (usually mathematical) models of human 
behavior that generate predictions about how behavior responds to 
different incentives. These predictions can then be used to specify 
empirically testable hypotheses, which subsequent empirical work 
can then support or refute. To the extent that empirical findings tend 
to support a model, economists can rely on that model to make 
predictions of how people and markets will respond to incentives in 
contexts that have not yet been tested, such as in response to a novel 
law or policy. 
2. Homo Economicus 
Perhaps the most central, and certainly the most often 
criticized, characteristic of the neoclassical approach is the 
assumption that actors behave “rationally.” In formal, mathematical 
models of behavior, rationality often takes the form of the 
assumption that actors in the model can calculate with infinitesimal 
precision and at zero cost the course of action that is optimal given 
their preferences.24 The actor such models describe is often called, 
generally Game Theory, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Game_theory 
[https://perma.cc/N8XU-2YND] (last visited Oct. 1, 2017).  
 23. See generally GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 
10-12 (2d ed. 1971); Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Marriage: Part I, 81 J. POL. ECON.
813, 813 (1973); Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,
76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 170 (1968). 
 24. Note that this conception of rationality takes as given the individual’s 
preferences and only asks whether the individual’s behavior is consistently and 
optimally directed towards those ends. This is the same conception of “rationality” 
that behavioral economics uses. See Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics’ 
Perfect Rationality Should Not Be Traded for Behavioral Law and Economics’ 
Equal Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 67, 80 (2002) (“Within behavioral [economics], 
. . . the rationality concept is one of procedural rationality, or a set of norms for how
judgments and choices should be made as opposed to a set of norms about what ends
should be sought.”). 
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disparagingly, homo economicus, in contradistinction from actual 
human beings: homo sapiens.25
The rationality of homo economicus is unrealistic, clearly. 
Indeed, for more than forty years, research in behavioral economics 
and behavioral psychology has piled up evidence that human beings 
simply do not behave “rationally” in this sense. But it is important to 
understand that this conception of rationality has always been 
something of a straw man.  
As a leading figure in behavioral economics, Daniel 
Kahneman, long ago acknowledged: 
No one ever seriously believed that all people have rational beliefs and 
make rational decisions all the time. The assumption of rationality is 
generally understood to be an approximation, which is made in the belief 
(or hope) that departures from rationality are rare when stakes are 
significant, or that they will disappear under the discipline of the market.26
In other words, adherents to the neoclassical tradition have no 
illusions that homo economicus resembles any human being; rather, 
they see neoclassical theory as an analytically parsimonious and 
policy-relevant approximation of real-world behavior.27 Neoclassical 
theory makes this assumption for the convenience of mathematical 
modeling. It simplifies the math and serves as a rough approximation 
of a much milder, and more plausible, conception of rationality: A 
“rational” actor is merely someone who directs her energies toward 
those things that make her better off and away from those things that 
make her worse off rather than the other way around.28
 25. See, e.g., Robert H. Frank, If Homo Economicus Could Choose His 
Own Utility Function, Would He Want One with a Conscience?, 77 AM. ECON. REV.
593, 593 (1987). 
 26. Daniel Kahneman, A Psychological Perspective on Economics, 93 AM.
ECON. REV. 162, 162 (2003). “[B]ehavioral law and economics stresses that 
conventional law and economics utilizes an empirically false model of behavior—a 
point already acknowledged within law and economics and championed years ago in 
regard to positive economics by Milton Friedman, one of the primary 
methodological influences on law and economics.” Mitchell, supra note 24, at 74 
(citing Milton Friedman, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in ESSAYS IN 
POSITIVE ECONOMICS 3, 3-43 (1953)). 
 27. Mitchell, supra note 24, at 69 (“Proponents of law and economics 
acknowledge this descriptive inaccuracy but retain the assumption [of perfect 
rationality] for lack of a better alternative for prediction and policy analysis.”). 
 28. See, e.g., Gary S. Becker, Nobel Lecture: The Economic Way of 
Looking at Behavior, 101 J. POL. ECON. 385, 386 (1993) (“The analysis assumes that 
individuals maximize welfare as they conceive it, whether they be selfish altruistic, 
loyal, spiteful, or masochistic.”). 
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Nonetheless, there always remains the danger that the use of 
the stronger version of rationality for the sake of simplifying the 
math makes the resulting models bad at predicting actual human 
behavior.29 After all, people may depart from the assumptions of 
rationality in systematic ways, such that even the milder conception 
of rationality is not adequate, not even as an approximation. And 
indeed, much of scholarship in behavioral economics provides 
evidence of exactly this problem. At least when one looks at 
individual decision-making, the predictions of neoclassical theory 
are often simply wrong.  
3. A Normative Commitment to Wealth Maximization? 
There is a second danger that can arise from reliance on 
stronger assumptions about rationality in positive models of 
behavior. If used unreflectively, the conception of “rationality” 
employed as a simplifying device in a model designed to predict
behavior can be transformed into a normative criterion for judging
behavior. If such a shift is made without explicit justification,30 the 
implicit argument looks like this: (1) we have modeled human 
behavior as if people care only about maximizing their own expected 
money wealth; (2) therefore, in normative and prescriptive analysis, 
we will declare as “optimal” the policy that maximizes total expected 
money wealth, because people actually do care only about 
maximizing their own expected money wealth. Obviously, though, 
conclusion (2) does not follow from the premise (1).31
 29. See also Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A
Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1484 (1998) 
(“While the assumptions of unbounded rationality, willpower, and self-interest are 
unrealistic, the force of behavioral economics comes from the difference in its 
predictions . . . . In this sense, our analysis is consistent with the precept originally 
proposed by Milton Friedman: Economics should not be judged on whether the 
assumptions are realistic or valid, but rather on the quality of its predictions.”). 
 30. Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: 
Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV.
1051, 1060 (2000) (“Although the use of the assumption that actors behave 
rationally is pervasive among law-and-economics scholars, the assumption is most 
often implicit.”). 
 31. Cf. Russell Korobkin, What Comes After Victory for Behavioral Law 
and Economics?, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1653, 1658 (“In the rational choice world, it 
was assumed that each individual’s behavior necessarily maximizes his subjective 
expected utility, given external constraints. This syllogism leads to a close 
relationship between normative law and economics theory seeking productive and 
allocational efficiency and a libertarian political philosophy.”). 
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Now, no serious adherent to neoclassical law and economics 
ever made this argument, and there may be sensible reasons for 
making wealth maximization a normative goal in some policy 
contexts.32 But unlike in economics, where disciplinary norms 
discourage excessive normativity, law and economics is a field 
within law, which is inherently normative. In the early years of 
neoclassical law and economics, there was less effort than there is 
today to sequester homo economicus to the realm of positive, rather 
than normative, models. To many observers throughout the history of 
the law-and-economics movement, it surely seemed that rational-
choice assumptions were not merely empirically problematic, but 
they had the effect of smuggling ideological commitments (i.e., in 
favor of wealth creation and against redistribution) into prescriptive 
models. Whether or not such concerns were entirely justified, there is 
no question that they generated backlash against neoclassical law and 
economics and fueled the rise of behavioral economics in law.33
B. Behavioral Economics 
The inauthenticity of the rationality assumption in neoclassical 
economics has long bothered many economists (and non-
economists), and leading economists have long challenged the need 
for rationality as a simplifying assumption.34 The movement to 
challenge the rationality assumptions of neoclassical economics took 
shape beginning in the 1970s with seminal work by, among others, 
Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, who documented preferences 
inconsistent with neoclassical assumptions about rationality, such as 
“loss aversion,”35 and systematic biases in individual decision-
 32. For example, one might argue (not without controversy) that legal rules 
should be designed to maximize wealth, and then taxes and transfers can be used to 
redistribute wealth to address concerns about equity. This view was defended in 
Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than the 
Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667, 667 (1994). 
 33. See, for example, criticisms of neoclassical law and economics’ “thick” 
conception of rationality in Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 30, at 1066.
 34. Classic papers calling for economists to incorporate a more nuanced 
model of human cognition and behavior into economic theory include Albert O. 
Hirschman, Against Parsimony: Three Easy Ways of Complicating Some Categories 
of Economic Discourse, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 89, 89 (1984), and Amartya K. Sen, 
Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory, 6 
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 317, 317 (1977). 
 35. See generally Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An 
Analysis of Decisions Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979). 
442 Michigan State Law Review  2017 
making, such as the “framing effect.”36 Behavioral economics 
became a major force in law and economics in the late 1990s, 
heralded by comprehensive critiques of rational-choice law and 
economics and introductions to behavioral research by Jolls, 
Sunstein, and Thaler,37 and Korobkin and Ulen.38
Another well-documented behavioral bias is the “anchoring 
effect.” The anchoring effect has been demonstrated in experiments 
in which subjects are asked to estimate some numerical quantity after 
being exposed to an irrelevant number.39 The irrelevant number 
serves as an “anchor,” drawing the estimates closer to the anchor 
even though the number is totally uninformative. To make this 
concrete: Asking people to recite the last two digits of their social 
security number will affect how much people are willing to pay for a 
cordless computer keyboard or a box of Belgian chocolates.40 Such 
obvious biases in decision-making are essentially impossible to 
square with a model of “rational” decision-making. 
But no finding in behavioral economics has had a greater 
impact on law and economics than the “endowment effect,” and if 
behavioral economics has a mascot, it is without question a souvenir 
coffee mug emblazoned with the logo of Cornell University. In a 
famous set of experiments, Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 
examined whether subjects (undergraduate students at Cornell) who 
were randomly assigned a coffee mug valued the coffee mug higher 
than (otherwise identical) students who were not randomly assigned 
a mug.41 What they found was a dramatic difference: Students 
endowed with the mugs valued them twice as much as those not 
endowed.42 In a series of related experiments, they ruled out other 
 36. See generally, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational
Choice and the Framing of Decisions, 59 J. BUS. S251 (1986). 
 37. Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 29, at 1471. 
 38. Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 30, at 1051. 
 39. For an overview of anchoring theory and a discussion of key findings 
from the anchoring literature, including in the context of legal decision-making, see 
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Andrew J. Wistrich & Chris Guthrie, Can Judges Make 
Reliable Numeric Judgments? Distorted Damages and Skewed Sentences, 90 IND.
L.J. 695, 701-10 (2015). 
 40. See, e.g., Dan Ariely, George Loewenstein & Drazen Prelec, “Coherent 
Arbitrariness”: Stable Demand Curves Without Stable Preferences, 118 Q.J. ECON.
73, 76 (2003) (finding “the impact of the social security number on stated 
[willingness to pay] was significant in every product category”).
 41. Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Experimental
Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325, 1325 
(1990).
 42. Id. at 1332-33. 
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potential causes of the observed difference, such as difficulty 
understanding or following instructions,43 strategic misrepresentation 
of values,44 income effects,45 or perception of the mug as a “prize.”46
These experiments have been replicated countless times in many 
different contexts.47 This is the endowment effect: Endow a person 
with something, and the mere fact of possession makes it more 
valuable to him than when he did not possess it.  
Results such as these have undermined the assumptions of 
neoclassical economics, and behavioral economics has been 
immensely influential in the legal academy, in public discourse, and 
in policy.48 Indeed, behavioral law and economics has become 
probably the dominant policy agenda in both the academy and in 
many government circles today. Most influential may be “soft 
paternalism,”49 or “libertarian paternalism,”50 which emphasizes 
behavioral “nudges” that preserve individual choice while 
constructing a “choice architecture” that favors welfare-enhancing 
decisions.
Now, what I have offered so far is a series of individual 
findings in behavioral economics, not the big picture for the field. 
What exactly is “behavioral economics”? Is it nothing more than a 
collection of empirical results? (Maybe; I will return to this concern 
shortly.) Here, I will simply highlight a few points of comparison 
 43. Id. at 1329-36. 
 44. Id. at 1336-38. 
 45. Id. at 1338-42. An “income effect” is a change in a person’s valuation 
of an object due to a change in a person’s wealth. Intuitively, a wealthier person may 
have greater willingness to pay more for something because she has greater ability to 
pay. Id. at 1339–41. Income effects are predicted by standard neoclassical theory, 
and thus a test for the endowment effect would need to rule out income effects as an 
explanation. Id.
 46. Id. at 1342. 
 47. For a review of the literature on the endowment effect, see Charles R. 
Plott & Kathryn Zeiler, Exchange Asymmetries Incorrectly Interpreted as Evidence 
of Endowment Effect Theory and Prospect Theory?, 97 AM. ECON. REV. 1449, 1452-
54 (2007). 
 48. See Ryan Bubb & Richard H. Pildes, How Behavioral Economics Trims 
Its Sails and Why, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1595, 1595-96 (2014) (“Regulatory policies in 
the United States are already being informed by BLE [(behavioral law and 
economics)].”). 
 49. Id. at 1604-05. 
 50. Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not 
an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1162 (2003). 
444 Michigan State Law Review  2017 
with neoclassical economics.51 Behavioral economics and 
neoclassical economics both study human behavior, and they both 
examine the role of incentives in human interactions. But there are at 
least three main points of divergence.  
First, behavioral economics takes as its starting point a 
fundamentally empirical rather than theoretical approach. Drawing 
on the methodologies and insights of psychology and other fields, 
behavioral economists have conducted a wide range of experimental 
studies, usually laboratory experiments, testing whether subjects’ 
behavior conforms to the predictions of neoclassical economics.  
Second, while neoclassical economics attempts to identify 
equilibria in markets, firms, and other institutions, most experimental 
work in behavioral economics focuses on the decision-making 
behavior of individuals. As Jeff Rachlinski has observed, this makes 
“behavioral economics” something of a misnomer. Economics is 
concerned with understanding the behavior of people in the 
aggregate—markets, corporations, governments, even social 
networks—but not individuals. The study of individual cognition and 
decision-making is the work of psychologists.52
Third, and most obviously, these experimental studies of 
individual behavior do not assume rationality! I have already given 
several examples of research reporting deviations from what one 
might expect a purely rational actor to do. There are countless others; 
I’ll describe two more (the contrast effect and the certainty effect) 
later.
Of course, these various effects are not predicted by standard, 
rational-actor models of neoclassical economics. And so now we see 
the sense in which behavioral economics is quantum economics. Just 
as Newtonian mechanics breaks down when we look at the 
constituent pieces of our universe, neoclassical economics breaks 
down when we look at the constituent pieces of our society: 
individual people. And just as quantum mechanics challenged the 
nano-foundations for Newtonian mechanics, behavioral economics 
challenges the nano-foundations for neoclassical economics. 
 51. The field of behavioral economics is too vast to summarize here, and I 
make no attempt. See generally Stephano DellaVigna, Psychology and Economics: 
Evidence from the Field, 47 J. ECON. LITERATURE 315 (2009). 
 52. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Psychological Foundations of Behavioral 
Law and Economics, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1675, 1675. 
 Quantum and Newtonian Economics  445
And that is not the end of the analogy. In my view, some of the 
same principles that motivate and organize quantum mechanics can 
help us understand quantum economics as well.  
III. AN UNCERTAINTY PRINCIPLE
FOR BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS
Laboratory experiments, by their very design, create an 
artificial environment. This artificiality is desirable because the 
whole point of the laboratory experiment is to isolate a particular 
aspect of human behavior so as to study it while holding all else 
constant. But precisely because lab experiments examine human 
behavior in an artificial setting, we should be alert to the possibility 
that the very act of observing subjects will lead them to change their 
behavior. There are many potential reasons for this: subjects may 
attempt to conform their behavior to the experimenter’s expectations; 
subjects may feel self-conscious, knowing they are being observed; 
and so on.  
This phenomenon is well understood in behavioral social 
science and goes by various names in the literature in behavioral 
economics: observer effect,53 Hawthorne effect,54 or demand effect.55
In the spirit of the analogy to quantum physics, I will refer to this as 
the Uncertainty Principle for quantum economics. Although this 
principle is often acknowledged, its implications for the relationship 
between behavioral and neoclassical economics, and for the future of 
law and economics, are not as well recognized. In this Part, I provide 
examples of important experiments that reveal the profound effect of 
 53. See, e.g., Timothy N. Cason & Charles R. Plott, Misconceptions and 
Game Form Recognition: Challenges to Theories of Revealed Preference and 
Framing, 122 J. POL. ECON. 1235, 1241 (2014) (defining the “classical observer 
effect” as “what is to be measured is influenced by the attempt to measure it”). 
 54. See Steven D. Levitt & John A. List, Was There Really a Hawthorne 
Effect at the Hawthorne Plant? An Analysis of the Original Illumination 
Experiments, 3 AM. ECON. J.: APPLIED ECON. 224, 227-28 (2011) (describing the 
various meanings of the Hawthorne effect and the setup of the original experiment). 
 55. See, e.g., Charles R. Plott & Kathryn Zeiler, The Willingness to Pay—
Willingness to Accept Gap, the “Endowment Effect,” Subject Misconceptions, and 
Experimental Procedures for Eliciting Valuations, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 530, 543 
(2005). I doubt that I am the first to connect the dots between uncertainty principles 
in quantum physics and observer effects in experimental psychology or economics, 
although none of the articles connecting quantum physics to law cited above do so. 
See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
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the Uncertainty Principle in experimental research and then draw out 
two key lessons for behavioral law and economics. 
A. Three Examples  
1. The Endowment Effect, Revisited 
As noted above, a large and impressive literature has reported 
countless studies documenting the endowment effect in carefully 
designed experiments.56 But rigorously demonstrating the 
endowment effect is no small feat; the mere fact that individuals 
would need to be paid more to sell an item (“willingness to accept” 
or WTA) than they would be prepared to pay to buy the item 
(“willingness to pay” or WTP) does not prove the presence of an 
endowment effect.57 There are countless other potential explanations 
that, unless ruled out, would confound any effort to attribute a gap 
between WTP and WTA to the endowment effect.58
For example, the fact that the experimenter hands the mug to 
the subject may signal to the subject that the mug is valuable; the 
subject upgrades her assessment of the mug’s value based on an 
inference that the mug is valuable, given that the experimenter made 
a deliberate decision to give her the mug (rather than something 
else).59 Thus, a subject who is given a mug and asked to sell it will 
give it a higher dollar value than a subject not given a mug. This 
pattern would be predicted by standard neoclassical theory, based on 
an individual’s rational updating of beliefs about a product’s value 
based on actions taken by others. 
Another closely related possibility is that attitudes about gifts
and other-regarding preferences may make subjects less willing to 
sell the mugs given to them.60 After all, many people would consider 
it rude or ungrateful to sell a gift immediately after receiving it—and 
to do so in front of the gift-giver! Yet many experiments testing for 
an endowment effect involve the experimenter handing a mug to a 
subject with the words such as “I am giving this mug to you,” which 
implies a gift. Then, inquiries about willingness to part with the mug 
are made in the presence of the same experimenter. Thus, the 
reluctance of mug-owners to part with their mugs may be a function 
 56. See supra notes 33-39 and accompanying text. 
 57. See Plott & Zeiler, supra note 55, at 531. 
 58. See id. at 531-32; Plott & Zeiler, supra note 47, at 1450. 
 59. See Plott & Zeiler, supra note 47, at 1455. 
 60. Id. at 1454. 
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of social pressures rather than a change in the subject’s valuation of 
the mug due to being endowed with it. 
Unlike the signaling story, however, this story about other-
regarding preferences is inconsistent with the narrow conception of 
self-interested preferences traditionally employed in neoclassical 
models. Thus, if other-regarding preferences explains the results of 
the endowment effect studies, this is still a “behavioral” result—but 
one based on a different behavioral phenomenon. 
In a series of meticulously constructed experiments, Charles 
Plott and Kathryn Zeiler replicated the iconic mug studies but refined 
their experimental design to rule out the effects of signaling, other-
regarding preferences, and other possible confounds.61 To rule out 
signaling, they added a statement in the instructions to subjects that 
the experimenter chose to give a mug (rather than something else) 
based on a coin flip.62 To rule out the effect of the mug being 
perceived as a gift, they removed any references to “giving” or “gift” 
when distributing the mugs, instead saying to the group of subjects, 
“These mugs are yours.”63 In a series of experiments in which the 
effects of signaling and other-regarding preferences were eliminated, 
evidence of an “endowment effect” disappeared.64
More generally, Plott and Zeiler show that tweaking 
instructions to subjects is enough to make the experimental results 
for the endowment effect go away.65 And realistic conditions, such as 
opportunities for learning and instruction or experience with a type 
of transaction, also eliminate the experimentally observed 
endowment effect.66 As they put it, “Either no ‘endowment effect’ of 
 61. Id. at 1450. Plott and Zeiler also account for the possibilities that 
subjects’ decisions are affected by observing other subjects’ decisions, that subjects 
were affected by the physical proximity of the mugs at the time their willingness to 
trade was elicited, or that trading away their mugs required more effort than 
retaining them. See id. at 1450, 1455, 1460-63. These other potential confounds, 
however, did not seem to be driving the results. Id. at 1458, 1460-61. 
 62. Id. at 1454-55. 
 63. Id. at 1454, 1459. 
 64. Id. at 1458, 1463. 
 65. Id. at 1463. 
 66. John A. List, Does Market Experience Eliminate Market Anomalies?,
118 Q.J. ECON. 41, 70 (2003) [hereinafter Market Anomalies]; John A. List, 
Neoclassical Theory Versus Prospect Theory: Evidence from the Marketplace, 72 
ECONOMETRICA 615, 624 (2004) [hereinafter Neoclassical Theory]; Plott & Zeiler, 
supra note 55, at 543-44. 
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the sort predicted by prospect theory exists or the effect is 
sufficiently weak that other phenomena easily swamp it.”67
2. Social Preferences and Observer Effects 
A frequent finding in the behavioral literature is that people 
have social preferences—in other words, a desire to treat other 
people fairly in a way that is inconsistent with the assumption of 
narrow self-interest that is usually made in neoclassical models.68 It 
is, of course, unquestionable that people indeed have such 
preferences. But to the extent that such preferences are a challenge to 
neoclassical theory, it is because neoclassical theory predicts that 
buyers and sellers in markets will be driven by private gain, not 
social preferences, in their dealing. For example, neoclassical theory 
might predict that sellers in a market will care about their reputations 
among consumers, but only to the extent that reputation helps them 
earn profits—not out of any non-instrumental desire to treat 
consumers with fairness. 
Do the findings of behavioral economics refute this prediction 
of neoclassical economics? The answer is not obvious. Laboratory 
experiments repeatedly find that subjects are willing to incur a cost 
to treat others fairly, but does this translate to the market? Or is this 
an artifact of the fact that the subjects (usually college students) 
know they are being closely observed by the experimenter (usually 
the students’ own professors)? 
John List set out to test these questions with a series of 
ingenious experiments.69 His study used as subjects not college 
students but professional memorabilia dealers—people who make a 
living buying and selling collectibles such as baseball cards—and 
conducted laboratory experiments where they would be offered a 
payment (say $20) by a buyer and asked for a baseball card of 
commensurate value.70 What he found in the laboratory setting was 
 67. Plott & Zeiler, supra note 47, at 1463. 
 68. John A. List, The Behavioralist Meets the Market: Measuring Social 
Preferences and Reputation Effects in Actual Transactions, 114 J. POL. ECON. 1, 2 
(2006).
 69. Id. at 3. 
 70. Id. Although secondary to his experimental objective, it is worth noting 
that by constructing a laboratory experiment where subjects undertook activities 
with which they were very familiar, List eliminated one of the major concerns with 
experimental work, which is that the subjects are confused by an unfamiliar set of 
demands placed upon them. 
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that baseball card dealers would select baseball cards of equal value 
to the amount of money offered them by a buyer in the experiment, 
even when the dealer could have gotten away with selling a baseball 
card of lesser value.71 (This was possible because many lower-value 
baseball cards are indistinguishable to the untrained eye from a 
baseball card in better condition.) This result confirmed the frequent 
finding in the experimental literature that people’s preference for 
fairness trumps the prediction of neoclassical models that self-
interest will lead the dealer to substitute the similar-but-lower-value 
card in order to make a greater profit. 
List then repeated the experiment not in the laboratory but in 
the field. He went to a real-world baseball card convention, and he 
had confederates posing as baseball card collectors approach dealers 
and offer them money for baseball cards. (Thus, the dealers did not 
know they were subjects in an experiment.) These confederates then 
returned and had their cards examined by experts in order to see 
whether the dealers had given them cards of equal value to the 
money offered, or if the dealers had substituted cards of lesser value 
that would be indistinguishable to untrained eyes.72 The effect of 
social preferences that was detected in the laboratory was only 
sometimes present in the real-world setting: Consistent with a 
neoclassical model in which only reputation (rather than reciprocity 
or fairness) constrains sellers, local sellers (i.e., sellers who were 
more likely to see the same buyer again) would offer a higher-quality 
card in response to a higher dollar offer—but nonlocal dealers (who 
would never see the buyer again and therefore had no repeat-play 
incentives) did not.73
3. Altruism and Stakes 
Another concern with many results from laboratory 
experiments, including experiments on the endowment effect and 
social preferences, is that the stakes of the experiments are too low to 
induce subjects to behave in the way they would in real-world 
settings. In a recent article by Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, she examines 
experimental subjects’ willingness to breach a contract in order to 
make more money.74 The experiment tests the neoclassical prediction 
 71. Id. at 4. 
 72. Id.
 73. Id. at 4, 22-24. 
 74. Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Incentives for Breach, 17 AM. L. & ECON. REV.
290, 291 (2015). 
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of “efficient breach,” in which a party deliberately breaches a 
contract because it is more profitable to break one’s promise than to 
comply with one’s contractual obligations. And it entertains the 
competing hypothesis that moral considerations lead people to keep 
their promises even when neoclassical theory says it is inefficient to 
keep a promise.75
Most of the subjects in the experiment did not breach their 
contracts even when it was in their financial self-interest to do so, at 
least when stakes were low. But for a profit of a mere $12, the 
majority of subjects would breach the contract, and when the payoff 
from breaking one’s promise reached $24, over 72% of subjects 
broke their promises.76 Most revealing was one of the reasons given 
by a subject for not breaching the contract: “Betrayal, for the most 
part, was not worth 4–15 extra dollars.”77
In other words, while it is surely true that moral considerations 
lead people to keep promises that they would otherwise benefit from 
breaking, what we find is a result that looks less like social or moral 
preferences, and more like homo economicus and the Law of 
Demand: People respond in predictable ways to changes in prices, 
even the price of a broken promise. For the experimental subjects, it 
might not be worth four dollars, or even fifteen dollars, but twenty-
four dollars to commit betrayal? Sure! 
B. Two Lessons 
In short, the take-away from studies such as those by Plott and 
Zeiler, List, and Wilkinson-Ryan is that showing that a behavioral 
phenomenon occurs under (some) laboratory conditions can prove 
that a phenomenon exists, but it is something else entirely to show 
that: (1) the phenomenon is sufficiently big that it will not be 
swamped by other factors outside the pristine setting of the 
laboratory; and (2) the phenomenon persists in real-world settings, 
where things like experience, learning, and competition may serve to 
compensate for or correct behavioral biases. 
Does this mean we should disregard results from laboratory 
experiments? Of course not. Rather, these studies counsel us to be 
mindful that observer effects are a serious concern in laboratory 
settings in the social sciences precisely because human subjects are 
 75. Id. at 291-93. 
 76. Id. at 300 fig.1. 
 77. Id. at 307. 
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cognizant of the experimental setting and influenced by the social 
context in which they behave.78 In the jargon of economics, 
laboratory experiments often have limited external validity, meaning 
that their results cannot necessarily be extrapolated to contexts 
different from the experimental setting in which the results were 
observed.
To be more precise, the Uncertainty Principle offers two 
lessons for behavioral economics. First, it inverts the critique often 
levied by behavioral economists that neoclassical economics relies 
upon “unrealistic” assumptions. The same gimlet eye cast upon 
neoclassical analysis can be directed toward behavioral analysis; 
both fields benefit from greater skepticism. Second, it identifies the 
directions future empirical work in law and economics should take. 
The “lab” will always be essential for identifying behavioral 
phenomena, but it is only in the “field” that policy-relevant empirical 
regularities can be measured. 
1. Lesson: Physician, Heal Thyself! 
The perfect-rationality assumption in many neoclassical models 
has long been pilloried as unrealistic, which it surely is. The concern 
is that findings based on artificially constructed and deliberately 
simplified theoretical models may be unreliable guides for policy in 
the real world. Scholars and policymakers who have long been 
uneasy with the formality and reductionism of neoclassical theory 
have enthusiastically embraced this trenchant critique of rational-
actor models by behavioral economists. 
But laboratory experiments have been the basis for the 
scholarly claims and policy prescriptions made by most behavioral 
economists, and the concern here is that empirical results based on 
artificially constructed and deliberately simplified empirical models 
may be unreliable guides for policy in the real world. The fear here is 
the “train wreck” noted in the introduction—a series of results, each 
an artifact of peculiar experimental conditions, becoming 
conventional wisdom. 
To be clear, this is not a defense of jumping to policy 
prescriptions based on simplistic neoclassical models. Instead, I am 
arguing for an equal dose of caution for scholars in law and 
 78. See generally, e.g., Steven D. Levitt & John A. List, What Do 
Laboratory Experiments Measuring Social Preferences Reveal About the Real 
World?, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 153 (2007). 
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economics who are tempted to jump to policy prescriptions based on 
simplistic behavioral experiments. Behavioral law and economics, in 
other words, would benefit from heeding its own advice. 
2. Lesson: Bring Law and Economics Research into the Field 
How, then, to make behavioral law and economics (and, for 
that matter, neoclassical law and economics) sufficiently robust in its 
findings to justify policy? The answer is to run experiments outside 
the lab with an eye toward identifying whether behavioral 
phenomena manifest themselves as empirical regularities in settings 
that are directly relevant to the legal or policy question at stake and 
where the artificiality of the lab is reduced.79 To be sure, this lesson 
is not lost on practitioners of behavioral economics. Indeed, the 
greatest achievements in behavioral economics over the past 
generation have been replications in the field (under realistic 
conditions and high stakes) of numerous seminal results from the 
laboratory.80
Experimental work in the laboratory, too, must continue. It has 
important advantages that make it a necessary part of any serious 
research agenda on behavior. Lab experiments and field studies 
simply have different strengths.81 Field studies, precisely because 
they involve more realistic conditions, are superior for predicting the 
direction and magnitudes of potential policy changes.82 Thus, a legal 
intervention intended to correct for a behavioral bias should (ideally) 
be supported by evidence from field studies indicating that the 
intervention will have the desired effect.  
Lab experiments cannot provide equivalent value for this task. 
Yet without laboratory experiments, how does one identify whether a 
bias exists in the first place, given the presence of many confounding 
 79. See Mitchell, supra note 24, at 75 (2002) (noting that for behavioral law 
and economics to have predictive power, it must accumulate “reliable data regarding 
. . . the resistance of nonrational behavior to incentives and debiasing mechanisms 
that may be available through legal and economic systems”). 
 80. See, e.g., Kahneman, supra note 26, at 162 (“The clearest progress has 
occurred in correcting and elaborating the assumption of selfishness . . . . 
Experiments conducted in low-income countries by investigators armed with dollars 
confirmed conclusively that quite a few people will forgo a substantial sum for the 
sole benefit of denying a larger sum to an anonymous stranger who has treated them 
ungenerously.”). 
 81. Plott & Zeiler, supra note 47, at 1450-51, 1450 n.3. 
 82. Id. at 1450 n.3 (referring to field studies as “parameter estimation”). 
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factors in real-world settings?83 The laboratory is the only setting 
where the researcher can control nearly all of the potentially 
confounding factors. It is no accident, therefore, that the seminal 
studies supporting prospect theory and identifying behavioral biases 
have been lab experiments. 
The next Part provides examples of how laboratory 
experiments, field experiments, and observational (i.e., non-
experimental) data from the field have yielded refinements to our 
understanding of the endowment effect and other behavioral 
phenomena in policy-relevant contexts. 
IV. A CORRESPONDENCE PRINCIPLE FOR
BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS
In the realm of physics, the Correspondence Principle tells us 
that Newtonian mechanics is basically wrong, but that it is a pretty 
good approximation at the scale of human society most, but not all, 
of the time. The analogous principle in behavioral economics is that 
neoclassical economics is basically wrong, but that it is a pretty good 
approximation at the scale of human society most, but not all, of the 
time. 
This presents a crucial question for behavioral law and 
economics: What happens when you aggregate from the level of 
individuals up to the level of firms, markets, and other social 
institutions? Cognitive biases that affect individuals might remain 
significant at the aggregate level, but they might not. Tom Ulen has 
made this exact point (albeit without further elaboration):  
As a theory of human decision-making, rational choice theory may be 
analogous to classical Newtonian mechanics: it describes and predicts 
much of routine human decision-making. For instance, all the consumers 
in a particular market—e.g., all the consumers of bicycles—when taken 
together, behave in the fashion that the theory predicts, even if some of 
them behave irrationally.84
Consider the following: In a marketplace, businesses that 
behave rationally will do better than businesses that do not. Six 
decades ago, Gary Becker made precisely this argument. If market 
participants make decisions based on biases, they will not be able to 
 83. Id. (referring to lab experiments as “theory testing”). 
 84. Ulen, supra note 10, 462; see also Porter, supra note 15, at 1593 (1991) 
(referring to the principle of “scale,” which is equivalent to what I describe as 
“correspondence”).
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make as much money as market participants who methodically and 
rationally calculate the profit-maximizing course of action.85
Does this mean that markets will eliminate all cognitive biases? 
No. Another study by John List is helpful here. In this study, List 
reran a version of the iconic “mug” experiments to test for the 
endowment effect among individuals at a collectibles convention, 
thereby studying the endowment effect among a group of subjects 
with varying experience in both holding onto and trading away 
collectibles such as baseball cards.86 The subjects were a mix of 
consumers who were merely attending the trade show and 
professional dealers who tended booths where they bought and sold 
collectibles.87 What List found was striking: Consumers with 
relatively little trading experience in collectibles exhibited a strong 
endowment effect, while consumers with “intense” trading 
experience, as well as professional dealers, had no endowment effect 
at all—their behavior was perfectly predicted by neoclassical 
theory.88 And that is the rub: The endowment effect does matter in 
real-world, market settings—but only in some circumstances.
Relying solely on “neoclassical” results will lead academics and 
policymakers astray; but so will reliance solely on “behavioral” 
results.
In this Part, I describe three examples of important research 
that shows the limit of quantum economics when applied at the 
“Newtonian scale,” i.e., longer time periods and interacting groups of 
individuals, rather than test subjects acting in isolation. What we find 
is that sometimes quantum effects disappear at the Newtonian 
scale—but sometimes they do not. And because law operates at 
varying scales, regulating individuals, markets, institutions, and so 
on, sometimes behavioral effects will dominate, and sometimes 
neoclassical effects will dominate. One doesn’t need quantum 
mechanics to build a bridge, but one does need quantum mechanics 
to build a smart phone. Similarly, the challenge for law and 
economics is determining when behavioral findings remain 
 85. See GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 16 (2d ed. 
1971).
 86. See List, Neoclassical Theory, supra note 66, at 617.  
 87. Id. at 617-18. 
 88. Id. at 621-22; see List, Market Anomalies, supra note 66, at 70-71 
(finding the same pattern in an earlier field experiment in which he endows subjects 
with different memorabilia, such as baseball cards or collectible pins). 
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important at policy-relevant scales.89 The three examples below lead 
us to two lessons for addressing this challenge. 
A. Three Examples 
1. Quantum Economics at Newtonian Time Scales 
In addition to the shift from isolated individuals to aggregates 
of individuals in market settings, another sense in which “scale” 
matters is temporal scale. Imagine workers engaged in collective 
bargaining with an employer over the structure of their wage contract 
in a setting where each worker individually produces output (i.e., a 
“piece rate” contract). An example of this is tea-plucking, where 
workers on a tea plantation collect tea leaves and are paid a baseline 
wage plus a piece rate per kilogram of tea leaves collected.90
Standard price theory would predict that a wage structure with 
a lower base wage but a higher piece rate would lead to higher 
productivity than a wage structure that pays a higher base wage but a 
lower piece rate. This is because workers receive the baseline wage 
regardless of effort, but the piece rate only with effort. A relatively 
high piece rate, therefore, incentivizes high effort.  
One can easily anticipate the “behavioral” rejoinder: A higher 
base wage and lower piece rate signals trust in the worker, reduces 
stress and anxiety, and triggers norms of reciprocity that could 
increase productivity, contrary to the neoclassical prediction. Thus, 
the behavioral prediction based on social and moral preferences for 
trust and reciprocity would be that a higher base rate and lower piece 
rate would lead to higher productivity. 
A recent paper by Jayaraman, Ray, and de Véricourt tested 
exactly these hypotheses in a real-world setting. Workers on a tea 
plantation in India experienced a switch from a high piece rate (with 
a low base wage) to a high base wage (with a low piece rate).91 What 
 89. Rachlinkski, supra note 52, at 1689-90 (“Institutional settings can 
reduce errors in judgment, and this concern is a more serious criticism [of existing 
work in psychology upon which behavioral law and economics relies]. 
Psychologists rarely study institutional settings even though most choices are made 
within an institutional framework. . . . [But] [d]ecisions by consumers, judges, and 
juries are not necessarily made with the kind of institutional framework that can 
improve judgment. The role of incentives and institutions is thus important but only 
deepens the project of BLE, it does not undermine it.”). 
 90. See Rajshri Jayaraman, Debraj Ray & Francis de Véricourt, Anatomy of 
a Contract Change, 106 AM. ECON. REV. 316, 316 (2016). 
 91. See id.
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they found was that in the first month following the change, there 
was an enormous surge in productivity—maybe a 40% increase 
relative to a comparison plantation without the change.92 This was 
clearly inconsistent with neoclassical theory and consistent with a 
behavioral explanation. 
But the increased productivity did not last. Three months later, 
the productivity of workers had regressed to the level predicted by 
price theory. Concepts such as trust or reciprocity had no explanatory 
power.93
So which is right: quantum or Newtonian economics? The 
answer is, roughly, “both”; but scale matters—in this case, the time 
scale. Price effects cannot explain the observed effects of the change 
in the first month of the new contract. The emotional or 
psychological effect of a higher base wage mattered, at least in the 
short term. But over time, the cold, relentless logic of the Law of 
Demand sufficed to explain the behavior of the workers. 
Does this mean that behavioral economics is irrelevant in 
longer time scales? Certainly not! Indeed, an important finding of 
behavioral economics is that people’s perceptions and preferences 
adapt over time to a new status quo.94 More to the point, though, is 
that the application of behavioral versus neoclassical methods 
depends on the policy-relevant question: Do we care about the effect 
of the wage-contract intervention in the short term (about one month) 
or the long term (four months or more)? If it is the latter, the simplest 
and most reliable model for predicting the impact of the policy is 
neoclassical.  
Field experiments in the United States have yielded similar 
results, albeit over much shorter time scales. Uri Gneezy and John 
List recruited subjects for (real) work doing data entry or door-to-
door fundraising for six hours.95 Although the jobs were advertised as 
paying $12/hour (data entry) or $10/hour (fundraising), participants 
in the “gift” treatment group were told they would be paid $20/hour 
 92. Id. at 323-25. 
 93. Id. at 339-40, 350. 
 94. For a discussion of literature in this area and an application to law, see 
generally John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan Masur, Happiness 
and Punishment, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1037, 1039-55 (2009). 
 95. Uri Gneezy & John A. List, Putting Behavioral Economics to Work: 
Testing for Gift Exchange in Labor Markets Using Field Experiments, 74 
ECONOMETRICA 1365, 1367 (2006). 
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(and in fact they were).96 Just as in the tea plantation study, if 
reciprocity is an important determinant of behavior, one might 
predict that workers receiving the “gift” treatment would be more 
productive.  
And so they were—up to a point. Over the first three hours, the 
gift-wage group was significantly more productive than the regular-
wage group. But by the second half of the working period, the 
productivity of the gift-wage group was indistinguishable from the 
productivity of the regular-wage group.97 Further, from the 
employer’s perspective the experiment “backfired”; the increase in 
productivity was far less than the increase in wages paid. More work 
would have been completed, at lower total cost, if more people were 
hired, all at $10 or $12 per hour.98
In these studies, the reversion from a “behavioral” response to 
a “neoclassical” response itself might have been predicted based on 
results from behavioral economics. The authors note different 
“psychological processes in the short run and in the long run . . . hot 
versus cold decision making,” as they label it.99 But if you are a 
business trying to make money in data entry or fundraising, which 
hypothesis—the behavioral or the neoclassical—will help you make 
money? This is the Correspondence Principle in action: Quantum 
economics is “right,” and Newtonian economics is “wrong,” but at 
larger scales, Newtonian economics will often be the better tool for 
analysis. 
2. Intermediaries and the Endowment Effect 
Another way that real-world market settings can differ from 
experiments involving isolated subjects is that in the real world, 
biased individuals have the benefit of others who might be in a 
position to improve their decision-making. “Two heads are better 
than one,” as the old saying goes, and perhaps two heads are more 
“rational” than one, as well. More precisely, in market settings we 
often make transactions, especially major transactions such as buying 
a home or starting a business, with the aid of experienced 
intermediaries, such as lawyers.  
 96. Id. The treatment and control groups in each experiment were isolated 
from each other to avoid the subjects knowing the existence of another group being 
paid a different wage. Id. at 1370.  
 97. Id. at 1370. 
 98. Id. at 1378. 
 99. Id. at 1366. 
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A recent paper by Jennifer Arlen and Stephan Tontrup explores 
the role of intermediaries on the endowment effect.100 The study is a 
laboratory experiment, very much in the spirit of countless other 
laboratory experiments on the endowment effect. The subjects of this 
experiment were each given a lottery ticket. The lottery ticket had a 
payoff that depended on the flip of a coin. Some tickets would win if 
the coin came up heads, and others won if the coin came up tails. A 
winning ticket would give the students eight euros, while a losing 
ticket would pay nothing.101
After each subject was given a ticket and he or she had a 
chance to see whether the ticket would win with heads or win with 
tails, each subject had the chance to trade his or her ticket for a ticket 
of the opposite type. A ticket that won with heads could be 
exchanged for a ticket that won with tails, and vice versa. If a subject 
made such a trade, she would get paid a twenty-five euro-cent bonus 
regardless of whether or not the ticket won.102
Given that heads and tails have exactly equal probabilities of 
winning, conventional neoclassical theory predicts that most or all 
subjects will trade their tickets. After all, making an exchange is like 
getting twenty-five cents for free. But the behavioral prediction 
would be that most subjects would not exchange their tickets because 
of the endowment effect. 
What Arlen and Tontrup found was a dramatic confirmation of 
the endowment effect. Over 70% of the subjects did not trade. In 
other words, over 70% of subjects chose to forgo the opportunity for 
free money after being endowed with a lottery ticket.103
Then they ran a second experiment. This one had a twist. It 
used the same set of lottery tickets, and the bonus for trading one’s 
ticket remained the same as well. But this time, the decision whether 
or not to exchange the ticket would not be made by the subject 
herself but instead by her agent. Each subject had an agent, 
designated by the experimenter, who was simply another student 
participating in the experiment. The agent would not share in any of 
the payments to the subject but instead would get paid separately. 
The agent’s payment was based on an incentive scheme chosen by 
the subjects: Each subject would choose whether the agent would 
 100. See Jennifer Arlen & Stephan Tontrup, Does the Endowment Effect 
Justify Legal Intervention? The Debiasing Effect of Institutions, 44 J. LEGAL STUD.
143, 144-45 (2015). 
 101. Id. at 148. Eight euros was worth about $11 at the time. Id.
 102. Id.
 103. Id. at 154. 
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receive the incentive payment only if the agent traded the ticket, or 
only if the agent did not trade the ticket.104
Now, given that in the first experiment over 70% of the 
subjects refused to exchange their tickets, one would expect that 70% 
of the subjects would give their agents an incentive not to trade. But 
Arlen and Tontrup found the opposite. Over 75% of the subjects 
gave their agent an incentive to trade.105 It is as if the mere act of 
shifting responsibility for the final decision from the subject to the 
agent led the subjects in this experiment to behave in ways much 
more consistent with neoclassical theory than those same subjects 
would have behaved if they had to make the decisions themselves. 
Thus, we see that the endowment effect can be largely 
eliminated by the introduction of an agent who makes the decision 
on behalf of the subject. Importantly, this is so even though the 
agent’s instructions for what to do (i.e., the incentive scheme) were 
given by the subject herself. This experiment adds a little realism to 
the literature on the endowment effect—after all, for many of the 
major transactions we undertake in our lives we retain agents—and 
in so doing it reveals the fragility of the behavioral prediction of an 
endowment effect.106 Increase the “scale” of the transaction from one 
person to two and the effect nearly disappears. 
3. Judges and the Contrast Effect 
So far, I have described examples where behavioral effects 
disappear in the context of real-world institutions (transaction 
intermediaries) or long time scales (hours or months). But behavioral 
effects don’t always go away at the scale of real-life institutions over 
long time periods. A recent paper makes this point in a setting where 
the stakes could not be higher: real-world criminal sentencing. 
Many studies in the laboratory setting have found behavioral 
biases at work in decision-making intended to mimic judicial 
decision-making107 or jury decision-making.108 If these studies have 
 104. Id. at 152. 
 105. Id. at 155. 
 106. See also Linda Babcock, George Loewenstein & Samuel Issacharoff, 
Creating Convergence: Debiasing Biased Litigants, 22 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 913, 922 
(1997) (noting that lawyers can debias litigants to achieve mutually beneficial 
bargains).
 107. Holger Spamann & Lars Klöhn, Justice Is Less Blind, and Less 
Legalistic, than We Thought: Evidence from an Experiment with Real Judges, 45 J.
LEGAL STUD. 255, 276 (2016) (finding in an experimental setting that real-world 
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external validity, the stakes for real-world judging are enormous. Do 
we observe behavioral biases in real-world judicial decision-making? 
Can we demonstrate this in an empirically rigorous way? 
In Relative Judgments, Adi Leibovitch notes a puzzle about the 
criminal sentencing of juvenile offenders. In study after study, 
researchers have found that minors who are sentenced in the juvenile 
justice system receive harsher sentences than minors who are 
sentenced in the regular criminal courts for the identical crime.109
How could it be that an alternate system especially created to provide 
greater leniency towards minors would have the opposite effect? 
Leibovitch hypothesizes that behavioral economics has the answer: 
This strange result is due to the “contrast effect.”110
In the context of criminal sentencing, the contrast effect will 
lead a judge to exaggerate the lenity or severity of a sentence in a 
given case based on comparisons with other cases. A judge who has 
heard many petty cases will perceive a moderately severe case as 
relatively grave and impose a high sentence. A judge who has heard 
many cases involving heinous crimes will perceive a moderately 
severe case as relatively mild and impose a low sentence. Because 
judges in the juvenile system tend to deal with a baseline of less-
serious cases, cases right on the borderline between going to juvenile 
court and regular criminal court seem very serious. And because 
judges in the regular criminal system have a baseline of more-serious 
crimes, those same cases, in contrast to the rest of their docket, seem 
mild.111
This is a clever hypothesis, but how do you test it? Without the 
ability to “experiment” on real cases, this is an immensely hard 
question to answer empirically. If you try to compare juvenile courts 
and regular courts, there are all sorts of differences that could 
potentially explain a difference in outcomes: maybe different kinds 
of people become juvenile court judges versus regular criminal 
judges will interpret identical legal rules in opposite ways based on legally irrelevant 
personal characteristics of litigants). 
 108. Edward J. McCaffery, Daniel J. Kahneman and Matthew L. Spitzer, 
Framing the Jury: Cognitive Perspective on Pain and Suffering Awards, 81 VA. L.
REV. 1341, 1403 (1995) (finding strong framing effects of jury instructions on non-
pecuniary damage awards). 
 109. Adi Leibovitch, Relative Judgments, 45 J. LEGAL STUD. 281, 319 
(2016).
 110. Id. at 288-89. 
 111. See id.
 Quantum and Newtonian Economics  461
judges; maybe the juvenile system has different procedural rules than 
the regular system; and so on.112
What Leibovitch did is take advantage of what economists 
refer to as a “natural experiment”—a situation where real-world 
circumstances have led to randomization roughly equivalent to the 
randomization into treatment and control groups that would occur in 
a laboratory experiment. She collected data from the Pennsylvania 
state courts and focused on a set of judges who were all elected in 
the same election and who all served in the same courthouses and 
applied the same law, in the same context, in the same communities, 
to the same pool of defendants. But—and this is a very important 
“but”—during their first few months on the bench, just by random 
chance, some judges happened to get a mix of criminal cases with 
more serious crimes, while other judges (just by random chance) 
happened to get a mix of criminal cases with less serious crimes. It 
was as if an experimenter was randomly assigning some judges to 
see a baseline set of serious cases and other judges a baseline set of 
mild cases.113
Of course, over time as more cases come through the door, the 
caseloads of every judge will all average out to the same level. Once 
the caseloads evened out, Leibovitch asked: Did their exposure 
during the first few months affect the sentences these judges gave? 
Do judges with a baseline of serious cases give the same sentence as 
judges with a baseline of mild cases when these judges are 
sentencing defendants for the exact same crime?  
No. A judge that was exposed to a higher baseline will give a 
sentence 25% shorter for the same crime than the judge exposed to a 
lower baseline.114 This is the contrast effect in action: not just in the 
laboratory, and not just at a collectibles convention, but in decisions 
affecting the incarceration of our fellow citizens. 
B. Two Lessons 
Do the behavioral biases that behavioral economics has 
identified dominate the patterns of behavior that we see? Or do the 
predictions of rational agent models used in neoclassical economics 
adequately describe human behavior? The resounding, if 
unsatisfying, answer the examples above give to both these questions 
 112. See id. at 284-85. 
 113. Id. at 291-93, 295-99. 
 114. Id. at 306. 
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is “sometimes.” Simply because we detect a behavioral bias at the 
individual level does not mean that we will see the same bias play 
out on a larger scale when we aggregate the behavior of hundreds or 
thousands or millions of people into a market, a society, or a political 
community. How individuals behave, acting alone in an 
experimental environment, may not correspond to how economically 
and legally significant entities like firms or government agencies 
behave. But it may. Just as an understanding of quantum tunneling is 
irrelevant to the game of basketball but indispensable to mobile 
telecommunications, Newtonian economics gets the job done some, 
but not all, of the time.  
This fact offers two lessons: one for neoclassical economists, 
and one for behavioral economists. The first lesson is that, because 
behavioral phenomena can be significant at policy-relevant scales, 
any serious economic analysis must be sensitive to the potential role 
of behavioral factors. Sometimes, maybe most times, the 
Correspondence Principle will apply, and the predictions of a 
behaviorally influenced approach will be no different from a more 
parsimonious, neoclassical approach.  
Further, over the past few decades, much of the literature in 
neoclassical economics incorporated behavioral advances into more 
traditional models.115 Conversely, behavioral economists, 
acknowledging the success that neoclassical models have had in 
many areas, recognize that overlap between behavioral results and 
neoclassical predictions is a feature, not a bug, of good economic 
theory.116
This brings us to the second lesson: Behavioral economics 
needs theory. If the myriad empirical findings of behavioral 
economics can begin to coalesce into a coherent theory of behavior, 
scholars and policymakers will be able to make more confident 
predictions about when and how behavioral phenomena such as the 
endowment effect or the contrast effect will matter at the scale of 
markets or courts and when they will not. 
 115. See Kahneman, supra note 26, at 166 (noting the limits of this approach 
to synthesis). 
 116. Jessica L. Cohen & William T. Dickens, A Foundation for Behavioral 
Economics, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 335, 337 (2002) (“This view of behavior is 
profoundly different from the standard view in economics but often will not lead to 
different predictions. . . . This is a desirable characteristic of a behavioral framework 
since that model often predicts well.”). 
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1. Lesson: We Are All Behavioral Economists Now117
An important lesson from our examination of quantum and 
Newtonian economics is that all economics is behavioral 
economics.118 Indeed, behavioral research brings economics back to 
its roots—all the way back to the likes of Adam Smith, who 
grounded his economic reasoning in thoughtful observation of not 
only the rational, but the moral and emotional motivations for real-
life human action. The popular association of Adam Smith’s 
“invisible hand” with the notion of homo economicus is perhaps the 
most profound misapprehension in economics.119 Smith himself 
considered his first monograph, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, to 
be his greatest work. It begins with these words: “How selfish soever 
man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his 
nature, which interest him in the fortunes of others, and render their 
happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it, 
except the pleasure of seeing it.”120
Smith’s far more famous reference to “not . . . the benevolence 
of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, . . . but . . . their regard to 
their own interest,”121 has to be understood in this light.122 To be sure, 
Smith saw self-interest as a primary motive force behind the 
prosperity created by markets. But the notion that humans are purely
 117. Cf. Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 465, 
467 (1988) (“To some extent, we are all realists now.”); Elena Kagan & John 
Manning, The Scalia Lecture: A Dialogue with Justice Elena Kagan on the Reading 
of Statutes, YOUTUBE 8:28 (Nov. 25, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=dpEtszFT0Tg [https://perma.cc/H9UP-HWWD] (“[W]e are all textualists 
now.”).
 118. See Korobkin, supra note 31, at 1655 (“The behavioral economic 
analysis of law—which is ecumenical enough to adopt basic insights of traditional 
analysis such as that law acts as a price system, that there tends to be an inverse 
relationship between the price of a good and the quantity demanded, and that in 
some situations individuals might, in fact, act optimally—has become the economic 
analysis of law.”). 
 119. ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 165 (Dover 2006) 
(1790).
 120. Id. at 4. 
 121. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE 
WEALTH OF NATIONS 16 (Hartford 11th ed. 1818) (1776). 
 122. Unfortunately, some of the most prominent champions of behavioral 
law and economics have not always done so. See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 30, 
at 1064 (concluding that the “implication [of Smith’s famous statement] is that if we 
can figure out what course of action will most profit the decision maker, we will be 
able to predict his course of action”). 
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self-interested would have been no less ridiculous to him than it is to 
us today. 
Hence, “behavioral economics” is, quite literally, neoclassical
economics. It is making new the economics of Adam Smith and his 
contemporaries. But in the latter half of the twentieth century, the 
discipline of economics became increasingly obsessed with 
sophisticated mathematical modeling and formal proofs derived from 
mathematical axioms that reflected strict assumptions about the 
nature of human behavior. One could have forgiven the outside 
observer for mistaking economics for a branch of applied 
mathematics.123 By exposing the absurdities of an excessive reliance 
on mathematical sophistication at the expense of descriptive realism, 
behavioral economics has done all of economics immeasurable good. 
To be sure, neoclassical economics was never entirely blind to 
the nuances of human cognition and emotion. Gary Becker, arguably 
the greatest economist of the past century, used neoclassical models, 
but always with the express purpose of untangling the complexities 
and foibles of real-world human behavior. In the view of Becker and 
his countless protégés (I will count myself as one of them), homo
economicus is altruistic, makes mistakes, yields to peer pressure, 
feels loss aversion, and even succumbs to addiction.124
Ironically, the icon of neoclassical law and economics (but 
whipping boy of behavioral law and economics), Ronald Coase, 
would have been the first to say that the messy reality of human 
interactions would lead real-world behavior to deviate from the 
predictions of simplistic mathematical models. In fact, he was the 
first to say this. This is the thesis of The Nature of the Firm,125 and he 
won a Nobel Prize for it.126
Unfortunately, this fact has been lost on a generation of 
students of behavioral law and economics due to an out-of-context 
 123. See, e.g., id. at 1054 (“Mathematical elegance often becomes the 
primary goal, with usefulness in the realm of law, that combines logic with human 
experience, a mere afterthought.”). 
 124. See, e.g., GARY S. BECKER, ACCOUNTING FOR TASTES 139 (1996).
 125. Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 386 
(1937).
 126. Strictly speaking, Coase won the 1991 Sveriges Riksbank Prize in 
Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel “for his discovery and clarification 
of the significance of transaction costs and property rights for the institutional 
structure and functioning of the economy.” The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in 
Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 1991, NOBEL MEDIA (Oct. 8, 2017), 
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/1991/
[https://perma.cc/7RS4-DQUU]. 
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focus on the so-called Coase Theorem, which is often stated along 
these lines: “In a world of zero transaction costs, the initial allocation 
of legal entitlements does not matter from an efficiency 
perspective.”127 Behavioral law and economics scholars, even those 
as eminent as Cass Sunstein, have claimed that Coase won a Nobel 
Prize for the Coase Theorem and that “behavioral law and economics 
shows that the Coase Theorem is often wrong.”128
This is inaccurate, as Coase won his Nobel Prize for his work 
on property rights and the theory of the firm. In fact, Coase did not 
even come up with the Coase Theorem. The author of the Coase 
Theorem was George Stigler, a point Coase himself was keen to 
emphasize.129 But more importantly, this claim that behavioral 
economics refutes the Coase Theorem misunderstands Coase’s 
contribution. Coase had no interest in a world of zero transaction 
costs any more than he had interest in understanding a world 
populated by unicorns and leprechauns. Those worlds do not exist.130
The thrust of Coase’s insights in The Nature of the Firm131 and 
The Problem of Social Cost132 was that we can understand deviations 
 127. See, e.g., Bingyuang Hsiung, Sailing Towards the Brave New World of 
Zero Transaction Costs, 8 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 153, 153 (1999) (“In a world of zero 
transaction costs, regardless of how the property rights are assigned initially, 
resources will be utilized efficiently in the sense that the value of production will be 
maximized.”). An influential, early formulation to this effect appears in Harold 
Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 349 (1967) 
(“[I]n a world of zero transaction costs[,] [t]he output mix that results when the 
exchange of property rights is allowed is efficient and the mix is independent of who 
is assigned ownership . . . .”). 
 128. Cass R. Sunstein, Introduction, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 2
(Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000). 
 129. See Ronald H. Coase, Centennial Coase Lecture, U. CHI. NEWS 37:56 
(2003), https://news.uchicago.edu/multimedia/ronald-coase-centennial-coase-lecture 
[https://perma.cc/T3EH-62AR] (“[The Problem of Social Cost] was a great success. 
It helped to create the modern subject of Law and Economics; it has been cited more 
than any other article in the modern economics literature. However, much of this 
attention does not relate to what I said in that article, but to something called the 
Coase Theorem. This was invented by George Stigler.”). As an aside, this 
misattribution is an example of Stigler’s Law, which is that “[n]o scientific 
discovery is named after its original discoverer.” Stephen M. Stigler, Stigler’s Law 
of Eponymy, 39 TRANSACTIONS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 147, 147 (1980). As Stephen Stigler 
explains, Stigler’s Law was discovered by Robert Merton. Id.
 130. See Coase, supra note 129, at 39:44 (“Of course, in making one’s 
argument, it’s quite all right to simplify, but this has to be done sensibly. . . . [Yet] 
people didn’t say, ‘Oh, we’re neglecting the effect of transaction costs in this 
particular transaction.’ They said, ‘In a world of zero transaction costs,’ which is . . . 
a world that couldn’t exist.”). 
 131. See generally Coase, supra note 125. 
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from market structures and efficient private ordering if we 
understand transaction costs, and we sometimes improve markets 
and social welfare by reducing transaction costs. 
But what are transaction costs? What are the costs that prevent 
the reallocation by contract of initial endowments to their most 
valuable uses? Well, there are obvious ones, such as the time and 
money required to find a buyer or seller, but cognitive phenomena 
such as the endowment effect also create frictions that inhibit value-
increasing exchanges. In this way, behavioral insights naturally 
integrate themselves into familiar, neoclassical frameworks.
Even more broadly, one can apply the central tenet of 
neoclassical economics, the Law of Demand, to generate hypotheses 
about when behavioral biases are more likely to manifest themselves. 
To quote Coase: “When the price of being irrational is very high, 
people don’t do much of it.”133 This brings us to the second lesson: 
Behavioral law and economics, no less than neoclassical law and 
economics, needs theory. 
2. Lesson: Build Theories for Quantum Law and Economics 
Behavioral economics has thoroughly succeeded in 
undermining our confidence in economic analysis based on the 
unreflective assumption that homo economicus is an adequate model 
for human behavior. But to date, the achievements of behavioral 
economics have been largely negative—showing what is not the 
case, rather than providing a superior set of alternatives to guide our 
analysis.134 This is a striking dis-analogy between behavioral 
economics and quantum physics. Quantum physics has a (nearly) 
comprehensive theory of the behavior of the physical world at the 
nanoscale.
 132. See generally Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 56 J.L. &
ECON. 837 (1960). 
 133. Coase, supra note 129, at 53:35; see also Gary S. Becker, Irrational
Behavior and Economic Theory, 70 J. POL. ECON. 1, 12-13 (1962).
 134. See Cohen & Dickens, supra note 116, at 335 (“[Behavioral economics] 
has been most successful in documenting failures of the rational-actor model (e.g., 
failures of expected-utility theory, irrational cooperation, and time-inconsistent 
preferences). However, attempts to incorporate these observations into theory have 
been ad hoc[.]”); Mitchell, supra note 24, at 77 (noting that behavioral law and 
economics “usefully directs attention to the behavioral assumptions underlying the 
law, it presently offers little helpful guidance about how to amend prevailing 
assumptions”). 
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This lack of theory threatens to render behavioral economics 
incoherent or even self-defeating. The voluminous and rich literature 
detailing behavioral heuristics and biases leads to a wide range of 
predictions—sometimes conflicting predictions—about human 
behavior. Unlike neoclassical economics, which has rational 
behavior as its unifying concept and the Law of Demand as its 
unifying prediction, behavioral economics does not have a unifying 
theoretical framework—and indeed, given its varied and complex 
empirical findings, it would be foolhardy to assume that a single
unifying principle is out there, waiting to be found. But a natural and 
important next step would be to build up a set of theories, maybe 
even many theories, that apply to specific contexts and to specific
categories of biases. Such theories will aid policymakers in 
predicting which of the many cognitive biases will matter the most in 
a given real-world setting.  
Without this, what we have at this point is a dizzying array of 
heuristics, biases, and other cognitive quirks that have been 
identified through myriad experiments. For example, the Wikipedia 
page called “List of Cognitive Biases” names 183 different biases.135
Not surprisingly, some of these biases cut in opposite directions. I’ve 
already noted the “contrast effect,” which leads people to move their 
quantitative judgments away from a given baseline. But what about 
the “anchoring effect,” which leads people to move their quantitative 
judgments toward a previously observed baseline? How then are we 
supposed to use behavioral economics to predict future behavior?  
This is not a fanciful concern. Seminal experimental work on 
judge and jury decision-making has emphasized that the anchoring 
effect draws judicial sentences and jury verdicts closer to irrelevant 
anchors.136 Based on these findings on the anchoring effect, we might 
think that the irrelevant baseline set by low sentences in earlier cases 
will lead real-world judges to set sentences relatively low. Yet 
Leibovitch finds exactly the opposite. The contrast effect leads real-
world judges who observe a baseline of low sentences to set 
sentences relatively high.137 More generally, with 183 biases to 
choose from and precious little data on behavior in real-world 
settings, what is a policymaker to do? The danger is that scholars and 
 135. List of Cognitive Biases, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
List_of_cognitive_biases [https://perma.cc/C8LF-KL9Z] (last visited Oct. 1, 2017). 
 136. See Birte Englich & Thomas Mussweiler, Sentencing Under 
Uncertainty: Anchoring Effects in the Courtroom, 31 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL.
1535, 1546 (2001); McCaffery, Kahneman & Spitzer, supra note 108, at 1385. 
 137. Leibovitch, supra note 109, at 288-89.  
468 Michigan State Law Review  2017 
policymakers will simply pick and choose among biases, basing 
policy recommendations on arbitrary subsamples of potentially 
relevant behavioral phenomena.138
This is why broader theories of behavior are necessary. And 
there is nothing inherent in the behavioral approach that forecloses a 
more unified, theory-driven approach. Indeed, Kahneman and 
Tversky’s 1979 Econometrica piece, which is perhaps the seminal 
work in behavioral economics, did not merely present empirical 
evidence of loss aversion, but developed and presented an explicit, 
formal theory (“prospect theory”) that could be used to generate 
predictions about how loss aversion would affect behavior across 
many contexts.139 Prospect theory was not a rejection of formal 
theory, but a call for better theory, theory in which individuals 
optimize their utility based on biased and loss-averse preferences.140
In sum, the findings of behavioral economics are numerous and 
varied, but this rich array of results is both a blessing and a curse. 
People are overly optimistic, which causes them to behave in risk-
seeking ways; but people have loss aversion, which causes them to 
behave in risk-averse ways. There is an anchoring effect, which 
causes estimates to be biased toward initial baselines; but there is a 
contrast effect, which causes estimates to be biased away from initial 
baselines. Without some theory to connect these ideas, how do we 
 138. See Rachlinski, supra note 52, at 1687 (recognizing that “absent an 
organizing framework, [behavioral law and economics] scholars can cherry-pick 
from a range of cognitive phenomena to support whatever policy preference is 
consistent with their political views”); see also Cohen & Dickens, supra note 116, at 
335 (“The lack of theoretical foundations causes a number of problems for BE 
[behavioral economics]. First, empirical analysis can show the inadequacy of 
mainstream theory, but it does little to help develop alternatives. Second, without a 
coherent theory it is difficult to develop new applications. Third, the policy 
influence of [behavioral economics] is limited by its inability to predict 
circumstances in which anomalous behavior will arise (other than those sorts of 
circumstances in which it has been observed before) or how it will respond to policy 
changes. Finally, it is hard to judge the welfare implications of policy if we do not 
understand the origins of such behavior.”). 
 139. Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 35, at 274-77. 
 140. See also Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 29, at 1475 (“Behavioral 
economics does not suggest that behavior is random or impossible to predict; rather 
it suggests, with economics, that behavior is systematic and can be modeled. We 
attempt to sketch several such models here.”); Matthew Rabin, Incorporating 
Fairness into Game Theory and Economics, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 1281, 1282-83 
(1993) (discussing a formal model of “fairness” and using the model to explain a 
series of results from behavioral experiments). 
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know which of these opposite forces will predominate in response to 
a new law? 
This brings us to the third concept from quantum physics, the 
Quantum Principle. It offers the basis for a conjecture that the 
concept of quanta may offer a fruitful direction for a theory that will 
help unify a few of the disparate empirical results in behavioral 
economics. 
V. A QUANTUM CONJECTURE FOR BEHAVIORAL LAW AND 
ECONOMICS
To say a theory would help is not to provide a theory. Further, 
human decision-making and behavior is far too complex to be 
reduced to a single, comprehensive theory. But behavioral 
economists, going back to the earliest work in the field, have 
attempted to make progress toward a firmer theoretical grounding for 
the field.141 In that spirit, I offer here a (very tentative) conjecture that 
may contribute to one future theory in behavioral economics. 
We perceive our own cognition, effort, and attention in a 
Newtonian way: smoothly and continuously adjustable, such that I 
can think a little bit harder or work a little bit less on any particular 
task. Newtonian mechanics—and Newtonian economics—assumes 
that this is exactly how the world works. It is perhaps no coincidence 
that the primary mathematical tool for both Isaac Newton’s laws of 
motion and Gary Becker’s price theory is calculus, a technique that 
generates elegant solutions to complex problems by conceptually 
breaking every curve or shape down into infinitely small bits. 
As noted above, this isn’t quite true in physics. Quantum 
mechanics concerns itself with quanta: small, but discrete and 
indivisible quantities. What if quantum economics did, too? I suggest 
what I will call the Quantum Conjecture: Human cognition occurs in 
discrete quanta. People have a finite set of packets of attention or 
energy that cannot be subdivided as the occasion warrants.142
 141. See Cohen & Dickens, supra note 116, at 337 (“This view of behavior 
is profoundly different from the standard view in economics but often will not lead 
to different predictions. . . . [T]his is a desirable characteristic of a behavioral 
framework since that model often predicts well.”); Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra
note 29, at 1475. 
 142. To be clear, this conjecture is a positive claim about behavior, not a 
descriptive claim. I do not assert that human attention or energy actually takes the 
form of packets, but rather that human behavior might be better understood with a 
model that assumes we behave as if our cognition could only be parceled into 
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Consider the notion of the “tyranny of choice.” Having too 
many options may be paralyzing rather than liberating. The 
conventional wisdom in neoclassical economics is that giving people 
an additional option always makes them better off—or at least no 
worse off. After all, if they don’t like the new option, they can 
simply do what they were doing before; and if they do like the new 
option, then they are strictly better off. Yet personal experience, if 
not behavioral research, tells us that often things are not so simple.143
As options multiply, we cannot simply divide and further 
subdivide our attention and cognitive effort among an ever-growing 
list of priorities. It seems as though there is a minimum, indivisible 
quantum of attention that we can deploy. As a consequence, some 
tasks or options receive a packet of our attention, while other options 
are ignored, even if, in a Newtonian world, we could spread our 
attention evenly and ever more thinly across all of these options. 
I would argue that one manifestation of this is the “certainty 
effect,” which was identified long ago by Amos Tversky and Daniel 
Kahneman.144 People would rather eliminate a small risk (thereby 
reducing total risk by a small amount) than to drastically limit, but 
not eliminate, a large risk (thereby reducing total risk by a large 
amount). This is a terrible policy preference, but there is logic to it. 
Reducing the big risk leaves one with just as many risks to worry 
about as before. Eliminating a small risk reduces the number of 
discrete topics one need to think about. Life has become simpler; the 
cognitive burden of attending to risk has been relieved, and mental 
faculties have been freed up for other tasks. More generally, the 
cognitive load imposed by decision-making and multitasking is 
indivisible packets. In this sense, the Quantum Conjecture hews to the neoclassical 
approach to modeling. See Friedman, supra note 26, at 3. 
 143. The “choice overload hypothesis”—that increasing the number of 
choices will reduce willingness to choose or satisfaction with a choice made—has 
been the subject of many studies seeming to confirm the phenomenon. See Benjamin 
Scheibehenne, Rainer Greifeneder & Peter M. Todd, Can There Ever Be Too Many 
Options? A Meta-Analytic Review of Choice-Overload, 37 J. CONSUMER RES. 409, 
409 (2010). But it has not been consistently confirmed as an empirical matter. Id. at 
421 (finding that the effect of increasing the number of options, estimated in fifty 
separate experiments, was on average almost exactly zero, but noting substantial 
variation in results across studies). 
 144. Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 35, at 274. See also John W. Pratt & 
Richard J. Zeckhauser, Willingness to Pay and the Distribution of Risk and Wealth,
104 J. POL. ECON. 747, 748 (1996). 
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deceptively high.145 It is a kind of internal transaction cost that 
introduces a huge amount of friction into human decision-making. 
The idea that consideration of options or information is costly 
to people is in fact a familiar one in neoclassical economics, too. 
Although traditional rational choice models would often ignore such 
cognitive costs, a considerable modern literature incorporates such 
costs into the study of decision-making. A nice example of this is 
Benjamin Lester, Nicola Persico, and Ludo Visschers’s Information
Acquisition and the Exclusion of Evidence in Trials,146 which uses the 
fact that processing information imposes a cognitive cost to explain 
the contours of Federal Rule of Evidence 403, which gives the judge 
discretion to exclude evidence if its probative value is outweighed by 
“unfair prejudice.”147 Their model assumes that jurors are “fully 
rational” but are “cognitive misers” because processing information 
is burdensome.148 In this way, they deploy a set of theoretical tools 
familiar to “Newtonian” economists, but in a way that recognizes the 
“quantum” reality of human behavior. 
In the remainder of this Part, I present three examples of 
disparate phenomena—involving consumer protection, public health, 
and environmental regulation—which I argue might be explained by 
a single, simple analytical framework: a quantum approach to 
behavioral law and economics. I then draw two lessons from this 
excursion into a “quantum” theory for behavioral law and 
economics. First, it reveals the symbiotic, complementary 
relationship between neoclassical and behavioral economics. The 
notion that these are competing paradigms for analysis is not only 
mistaken but deeply misguided. For many important policy 
problems, it is simply not possible to undertake sensible analysis 
without utilizing both behavioral insights and price theory in tandem. 
Second, recognizing the interrelationships between behavioral and 
neoclassical economics also explodes one of the most stubborn 
myths in law and economics: that neoclassical economics is a 
reflection of conservative or anti-regulatory ideologies, and that 
behavioral economics caters to progressive or pro-regulatory 
 145. See, e.g., Susan Weinschenk, The True Cost of Multi-Tasking, PSYCHOL.
TODAY (Sept. 18, 2012), https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/brain-wise/ 
201209/the-true-cost-multi-tasking [https://perma.cc/5X4L-ASZY] (“Recent 
estimates are that you can lose up to 40% of your productivity [] if you multi-task.”). 
 146. 28 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 163 (2009). 
 147. Id. at 163, 163 n.1. 
 148. Id. at 164. They provide some useful citations to the cognitive 
psychology literature on the “cognitive miser” phenomenon. Id. at 164 n.5. 
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ideologies. Not only is this wrong as a conceptual matter—
economics is methodology, not ideology—it is wrong as a predictive 
matter. Neoclassical economics can point toward more regulation, 
and behavioral economics can counsel for less. 
A. Three (Possible) Examples 
Here, I offer three examples of the wide array of phenomena 
that might be amenable to analysis in a unified theoretical framework 
built around the idea of quanta of attention. The examples below are 
straightforward and familiar, and surely one could invoke many 
others.149 The value of these examples is not that a “quantum theory” 
would predict these outcomes—such a result is both obvious and 
superfluous. Rather, the point of the exercise is to show that a single
set of theoretical assumptions can explain a wide range of otherwise 
disconnected phenomena. It is precisely this effort—to unify 
disparate findings in a common framework that allows us to make 
predictions about outcomes not yet observed—that behavioral law 
and economics requires more of. 
I will briefly note, too, that if a theory based on the quantum 
concept is valid, it should explain findings from the neoclassical 
economic literature as well. Implicit in the conjecture, therefore, is 
the claim that not only does the Quantum Conjecture gel with many 
behavioral experimental findings, it harmonizes them with many 
empirical findings in the more traditional economics literature. I’ll 
note two examples here. First, econometric estimates of the returns 
to higher education are so high that the fact that anyone doesn’t go to 
college can only be rationalized by assuming that the psychological 
costs of attending college are very high.150 Second, neoclassical 
theories explaining the extraordinary rates of CEO pay can only be 
rationalized if one assumes that juggling a large number of cognitive 
 149. I also note potential connections of the quantum concept here to Lee 
Fennell’s work on lumpiness in law. See Lee Anne Fennell, Lumpy Property, 160 U.
PA. L. REV. 1955, 1956 (2012); Lee Anne Fennell, Slicing Spontaneity, 100 IOWA L.
REV. 2365, 2368 (2015). The object of study in Fennell’s work is not lumpiness in 
cognition or attention, but lumpiness in activities or legal entitlements. Some 
activity levels are lumpy—you either go to the state fair or you don’t—while other 
activities can vary along a continuum—you can buy as many or few tickets as you 
want for rides once you get to the state fair. 
 150. See David Card, Estimating the Return to Schooling: Progress on Some 
Persistent Econometric Problems, 69 ECONOMETRICA 1127, 1145-55 (2001). 
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tasks is extraordinarily difficult.151 These outcomes are easily 
explained by a model of cognition built around scarce quanta of 
attention.
1. The Futility of Increasing Disclosures 
A simple and plausible application of the Quantum Conjecture 
would be to mandatory disclosures. Much of the policy-oriented 
work in behavioral law and economics is directed toward improving 
consumer choice through mandated disclosures of relevant 
information to consumers.152 But one of the more sobering findings 
in the literature on disclosure is that most mandated disclosures are at 
best ineffective and at worst counterproductive.153 As scholars in this 
area have recognized, consumers lack either the inclination or the 
cognitive capacity (or both) to process the numerous disclosures 
attached to a product or service. A neoclassical model of disclosures 
might predict that the effectiveness of disclosures would decline 
smoothly, as an individual’s attention is gradually spread more and 
more thin across disclosures. A “quantum” model of disclosures 
might predict that the first few disclosures will have some level of 
effectiveness, but any additional disclosures will have no effect; the 
notion is that once the consumer’s quanta of attention are entirely 
divided up amongst the various disclosures and other product 
attributes, the consumer is simply unable to allocate attention to 
additional disclosures. 
2. GMOs, Health, and the Environment 
Many people avoid foods containing GMOs (genetically 
modified organisms) out of fear of the effects of GMOs on their 
health or on the environment. Widespread calls to mandate labeling 
of GMO food have led to legislation directing the FDA issue 
 151. See, e.g., JOAN WOODWARD, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION: THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 17-34 (1965); Oriana Bandiera et al., Span of Control and Span of 
Attention (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 12-053, 2014), 
http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/12-053_5de59810-1c7a-4101-
a58b-309376366347.pdf [https://perma.cc/BT6Y-MQNR]. 
 152. See, e.g., OREN BAR-GILL, SEDUCTION BY CONTRACT: LAW, ECONOMICS,
AND PSYCHOLOGY IN CONSUMER MARKETS 32 (2012); Bubb & Pildes, supra note 48, 
at 1594. 
 153. See, e.g., OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU 
WANTED TO KNOW: THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE 3 (2014). 
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regulations on GMO labeling.154 However, one of the leading figures 
in behavioral law and economics, Cass Sunstein, describes a 
scientific consensus that GMOs pose no threat to human health and a 
near-consensus that they pose little or no risk to the environment.155
This suggests that aversion to GMOs foods may be “irrational,” in 
the sense of reflecting heuristics or behavioral biases in perception of 
risk. One way to explain this alarmist reaction to these new food 
products is by reference to the certainty effect: Because of their 
novelty, any risks of GMOs are unquantified, and people seek the 
certainty of zero risk from GMOs.  
The “behavioral” regulatory response to this would be to deny 
such calls for mandated labeling. Interestingly, although the rationale 
is paternalistic, this is an example of a paternalistic response to a 
behavioral bias leading to a deregulatory, rather than pro-regulatory, 
policy recommendation. 
Conversely, a “neoclassical” analysis of consumers’ response 
to GMO foods would focus on price effects and the Law of Demand. 
This could lead to a different, aggressively regulatory 
recommendation. Here is the logic: Producing healthy food without 
GMOs raises the price of that food, reducing its consumption; 
therefore, consumer aversion to GMOs actually makes healthy food 
less affordable. And avoiding crops genetically modified to be 
drought- and pest-resistant means reliance on crops that require 
increased consumption of scarce water resources and greater use of 
pesticides—both of which harm the environment. These negative
externalities that opponents of GMOs impose on public health and 
the environment externalities could justify government intervention 
in favor of GMOs, rather than government inaction.  
3. Regulatory Overkill 
Nor is government immune to overreactions to risks. Kip 
Viscusi’s body of work on the cost-effectiveness of regulation has 
shown again and again how regulatory programs to eliminate risks 
that are already vanishingly small lead to regulatory costs of billions 
or even trillions of dollars on a per-life-saved basis.156 Such costs 
 154. See Cass R. Sunstein, On Mandatory Labeling, with Special Reference 
to Genetically Modified Foods, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1043, 1043 (2017). 
 155. See id. at 1044. 
 156. See, e.g., W. KIP VISCUSI, RATIONAL RISK POLICY (1998); W. Kip 
Viscusi & James Hamilton, Are Risk Regulators Rational? Evidence from 
Hazardous Waste Cleanup Decisions, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 1010, 1022-23 (1999). 
 Quantum and Newtonian Economics  475
would be better spent—thereby saving thousands of lives—
regulating in areas where the risks to human life are far greater but 
cannot be reduced to zero. Government, it seems, suffers from the 
certainty effect, or at least many of its regulatory policies seem to 
cater to a public bias in favor of certainty.157
A notable example of this appears in United States v. Ottati & 
Goss, Inc.,158 where the Environmental Protection Agency appealed a 
district court order in its favor ordering the defendant corporation to 
clean up a “Superfund” site contaminated by various pollutants 
including, as relevant here, a carcinogen called PCB.159 Although the 
district court required that the defendant ensure that the site meet a 
standard of no more than fifty parts per million (ppm) of PCB in the 
soil, EPA’s appeal sought a stricter standard of no more than twenty 
ppm, steps that EPA’s own studies estimated would cost nearly $10 
million.160 The rationale for such strict measures rested on the 
assumptions that “a) developers will build residential housing on the 
site, b) small children, playing in the backyard, will eat dirt 
containing PCBs, and c) the children will eat a little bit of dirt each 
day for 245 days per year for three and a half years.”161 As Justice 
Breyer, who wrote the opinion as a Circuit Judge, would later 
express puzzlement at,162 the weakness of this argument was that the 
site to be cleaned up was an uninhabited marsh.163 The only way to 
rationalize such a policy by the EPA was desire to reduce this one 
risk to zero, no matter how vanishingly small it would be otherwise, 
and no matter the cost.
 157. W. Kip Viscusi & Ted Gayer, Behavioral Public Choice: The 
Behavioral Paradox of Government Policy 19 (Vanderbilt Univ. Law Sch. Law & 
Econ., Working Paper No. 15-2, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2559408 
[https://perma.cc/3HM8-C9R9]. 
 158. 900 F.2d 429 (1st Cir. 1990). 
 159. Id. at 441. See Viscusi & Gayer, supra note 157, at 23-25, for a more 
extended discussion. 
 160. Ottati & Goss, 900 F.2d at 441. 
 161. Id.
 162. STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE 
RISK REGULATION 11–12 (1993). 
 163. Ottati & Goss, 900 F.2d at 442. 
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B. Two Lessons 
1. Lesson: Behavioral and Neoclassical Economics Are 
Complements, Not Substitutes 
As the GMO example above illustrates, behavioral and 
neoclassical forces are always operating together. Behavioral biases 
drive consumer behavior, thereby influencing supply and demand in 
any given market. Thus, behavioral economics and neoclassical 
economics are best understood as complements rather than 
substitutes; they are partners, not rivals.164 Seminal work in 
behavioral law and economics has made this point emphatically, but 
it bears repeating.165
In a recent article, Ryan Bubb and Patrick Warren provide a 
high-stakes, real-world example of how combining behavioral 
insights with neoclassical theory can improve regulatory efforts.166
They study employer-sponsored retirement savings plans, a subject 
of much discussion in the literature on “nudges” due to the 
widespread recognition that employees seem to systematically 
underinvest in retirement savings.167 One of the best-known policy 
recommendations in behavioral economics—one that has actually 
been heeded by Congress—is for employers to “paternalistically 
harness the stickiness of default rules . . . to counteract myopic 
workers’ temptation to save too little.”168 Legislation has encouraged 
employers to create automatic enrollment plans that set default 
contribution rates for their employees, so long as the employer sets a 
 164. For more examples of the importance of understanding how simple 
applications of neoclassical analysis can identify unintended consequences of 
behavioral regulation, including a discussion of perhaps the most famous example of 
this, the “Peltzman effect,” see Viscusi & Gayer, supra note 157, at 32, 32 n.84 
(citing Sam Peltzman, The Effects of Automobile Safety Regulation, 83 J. POL. ECON.
677 (1995)).
 165. See Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 29, at 1475 (“Behavioral 
economics is a form of economics, and our goal is to strengthen the predictive and 
analytic power of law and economics, not to undermine it.”); see also id. at 1481 
(“The first fundamental principle for the conventional approach is downward-
sloping demand: Total demand for a good falls when its price rises. This prediction 
is, of course, valid.”). 
 166. See Ryan Bubb & Patrick L. Warren, An Equilibrium Theory of 
Retirement Plan Design (N.Y. Univ. Ctr. Law, Econ. & Org., Working Paper No. 
16-28, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2823605 
[https://perma.cc/Z4W5-7F4J]. 
 167. See id. at 1. 
 168. Id.
 Quantum and Newtonian Economics  477
sufficiently high default. Yet despite the widespread adoption of 
automatic enrollment plans, Bubb and Warren report that overall 
retirement savings rates have not risen (and in fact may have fallen) 
as a result of the reforms.169
This outcome should be alarming to anyone optimistic about 
the role behavioral economics can play in improving regulation. The 
poster child for “libertarian paternalism”—the use of sticky defaults 
to improve individual saving decisions—seems to have utterly failed. 
Why? 
Behavioral insights describing individual behavior need to be 
placed in the context of market behavior. In the retirement savings 
plan context, Bubb and Warren explain how this plays out.170
Simplified somewhat, their argument goes like this: Given employers 
who attempt to maximize their profits and a workforce that contains 
both forward-looking and myopic workers, employers will structure 
their retirement plans to attract both types of workers at the lowest 
cost. Workers are attracted to employers who offer to match all 
employee contributions; all workers predict that they will contribute 
to the retirement savings plan at the maximum rate and thus reap the 
generous employer matching contributions. In the case of myopic 
employees, however, their forecast is wrong. Once employed, they 
will only contribute at the default rate. Thus, profit-maximizing 
employers will offer generous matching contributions (to attract both 
types of workers) but set relatively low default contribution rates (to 
save money on myopic workers, because they only have to match the 
default amount).171
Put simply, the policy intervention got the behavioral 
economics right but the neoclassical economics wrong. The result 
was a policy that appears to be worse than if the government had 
done nothing at all. 
 169. Id. at 3 (citing Bubb & Pildes, supra note 48, at 1637). 
 170. Their analysis is buttressed by a formal, neoclassical model of employer 
behavior. See id. at 4-8. The model is not necessary for the intuition I offer in the 
text above, but the model generates crisp empirical predictions, which one can test 
with data, and therefore assess the predictive validity of the model. Bubb and Ryan 
are, in fact, able to confirm the predictions of their model. Id. at 18-19. This model 
is an elegant example of how behavioral and neoclassical analysis can be 
synthesized into better theory. 
 171. Id. at 2-4. 
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2. Lesson: Economics Is Methodology, Not Ideology 
The GMO example also reminds us not to confuse 
methodology with ideology. In that example, we see a reversal of the 
usual trope about behavioral economics overturning the neoclassical 
skepticism toward government regulation. More generally, neither 
neoclassical nor behavioral economics incorporates any specific 
beliefs about the proper role of government or the scope of 
paternalism.172 They are simply tools for understanding how people 
behave. Sometimes we will learn something from them that leads us 
toward more regulation, sometimes less.  
Interacting behavioral and neoclassical economic analyses will 
sometimes lead one in the direction of more assertive regulation. In a 
prominent recent article, Ryan Bubb and Richard Pildes give 
examples of how popular policy prescriptions, such as the sticky 
default rules in the context of retirement savings plans described 
above, can be ineffective or even backfire:
[C]hoice-preserving regulatory tools are particularly weak medicine, we 
argue, when firms have incentives to undermine consumer choice. Instead, 
the interaction of optimizing firms with nonoptimizing consumers might 
better suggest traditional regulatory tools, such as product regulation, as 
well as measures designed to lower the incentives of firms to exploit 
consumer mistakes.173
In other words, adding consideration of market incentives and 
price theory to the mix leads Bubb and Pildes to favor heavier-
handed regulation. 
The interaction of behavioral and neoclassical economics can 
cut the other way, too. While consumers are prone to cognitive 
biases, “policymakers are also human” and thus also prone to 
cognitive biases when making policy.174 Taking into account the 
incentives of consumers in the market versus the incentives of voters 
or officials might lead us to worry less about “market failures” and 
more about “government failures.”175 In market settings, market 
discipline makes biases costly; to the extent that consumers succumb 
to biases in market transactions, they pay the price (either literally or 
 172. Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler described behavioral economics’ orientation 
as “anti-antipaternalitsm”—a rejection of a presumption in favor of free markets, but 
skepticism about the rationality of government, as well. Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, 
supra note 29, at 1541. 
 173. Bubb & Pildes, supra note 48, at 1600. 
 174. Viscusi & Gayer, supra note 157, at 5. 
 175. Id. at 7. 
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figuratively).176 While market settings don’t transform individuals 
into homo economicus, we saw above that market experience177 and 
the assistance of intermediaries in transactions178 dramatically reduce 
behavioral phenomena such as the endowment effect. But when 
consumers vote, what incentive does an individual have to de-bias 
himself? The winner of the election will not depend on his vote.179
Further, government actors are not subject to market 
discipline—and in the case of judges, they may not even be subject 
to electoral discipline. Think back to the study of contrast effects in 
criminal sentencing. Judges exercise a monopoly on criminal 
sentencing, of course, and thus there are no market forces that make 
it costly for judges to behave in biased ways. While there will be 
many cases in which we must call upon government officials to 
ameliorate the effects of behavioral biases, the behavioral biases 
most likely to go unchecked may be those manifested by government 
officials themselves. 
In short, economics isn’t ideology. Neoclassical economics, 
with its focus on externalities and market failures, often provides 
grounds for ambitious regulatory agendas.180 Behavioral economics, 
which catalogs the fallibility of human judgment in contexts where 
biases and heuristics are undisciplined by market forces, raises 
concerns about displacing private ordering with government 
regulation.181
CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have drawn a set of three analogies between 
physics and economics, with the objective of illuminating the 
relationship between behavioral and neoclassical law and economics. 
Behavioral law and economics has its own Uncertainty 
Principle: In laboratory experiments, the act of observation changes 
the behavior of the observed subject. This is not a fatal weakness, but 
rather a principle that offers two lessons. First, the limits of 
neoclassical theory to authentically describe reality must be weighed 
 176. Edward L. Glaeser, Paternalism and Psychology, 73 U. CHI. L. REV.
133, 138-39 (2006). 
 177. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text. 
 178. See Arlen & Tontrup, supra note 100, at 144-54.  
 179. Glaeser, supra note 176, at 140, 146-48. 
 180. Cf. Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Toward a Pigouvian State, 164 
U. PA. L. REV. 93, 100-04 (2015). 
 181. Glaeser, supra note 176, at 143-47.  
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against the limits of behavioral experiments to do the same thing. 
Second, the future of behavioral law and economics lies in an 
increasing emphasis on field experiments, or at least laboratory 
experiments designed to capture realistic features of the institutional 
contexts provided by the legal system. 
The Correspondence Principle tells us that neoclassical 
economics is wrong, but it nonetheless remains a good 
approximation for human behavior at the scale of human society—at 
least most of the time. It, too, offers two lessons. First, all economics 
is behavioral economics; the rational-actor assumptions of 
neoclassical economics are best understood not as a rejection of a 
more complete understanding of human cognition, but as a set of 
simplifying assumptions that are often desirable when studying 
behavior in settings such as markets. But to advance, neoclassical 
economics must continue to incorporate insights from behavioral 
economics. Second, for behavioral economics to be more relevant to 
policy, it needs theoretical frameworks that help explain when and 
how behavioral findings apply outside of laboratory settings and at 
scales relevant to policy. 
The Quantum Conjecture is an effort to draw an additional 
metaphor from quantum physics, one that may provide a conceptual 
nucleus for a tractable theory in behavioral economics. This third 
metaphor offers a third pair of lessons. First, behavioral and 
neoclassical approaches are complements, not substitutes, and should 
be employed in tandem. Second, the simplistic view that neoclassical 
economics is anti-regulatory and behavioral economics is pro-
regulatory ignores the longstanding grounds for regulatory 
intervention identified by neoclassical economics, but also (and less 
obviously) the potentially profound critique of government 
intervention that behavioral economics suggests. 
Finally, I note that as remote as this examination of behavioral 
law and economics may seem from everyday lawyering, the findings 
I have discussed above go to the heart of legal practice. Consider 
Arlen and Tontrup’s demonstration of the importance of 
intermediaries in de-biasing individual decision-makers. That study 
shows that even unsophisticated intermediaries performing trivial 
tasks have a dramatic effect on removing what would otherwise 
appear to be irrational behavior from transactions. Of course, in real 
life transactions are vastly more complicated, but then again, agents 
in real life are vastly more sophisticated. And these real-life agents 
are, of course, lawyers. The practice of law itself is perhaps the most 
ambitious application of behavioral economics yet underway. 
